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NOTES AND COMMENTS
The International Law of
Expropriation of Foreign-Owned
Property: The Compensation
Requirement and the Role of the
Taking State
I. INTRODUCTION
The eminent economic historian Alexander Gerschenkron has
noted that the more economically backward a nation, the more drastic
and explosive will be its road to industrialization.' In England, his-
torically the wealthiest nation in the world, the industrial revolution
was accomplished solely by the bourgeoisie. 2  In Germany, the banks
provided the necessary capital for industrialization. 3 In Imperial
Russia, the most backward European state, direct state intervention
was needed to finance economic modernization. 4  In the so-called
Third World,5 however, even state intervention has been ineffective
in achieving development. 6  A severe shortage of capital in these
developing nations has slowed the process of industrializa-
tion. 7  Consequently these nations have appealed to capital exporting
states to facilitate industrialization.8 The result of this appeal has
I. A. GERSCHENKRON, ECONOMIC BACKWARDNESS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 8,
44, 353-54 (1962).
2. Id. at 14, 45.
3. Id. at 13-16, 45.
4. Id. at 19-20, 45-46.
5. For the purposes of this note the terms "Third World," "developing nations"
and "less developed nations" will be used interchangeably They refer to those countries
of Latin America, Africa and Asia which, because of political and economic colonialism,
are retarded in industrial development. These nations possess two common characteris-
tics: (1) a lack of capital relative to the industrialized nations and (2) a prior history of
colonial rule. See W. RODNEY, How EUROPE UNDERDEVELOPED AFRICA 13-14 (1974).
6. Cf. GERSCHENKRON, supra note 1, at 8 ("Borrowed technology . . . was one of
the primary factors assuring a high speed of development in a backward country entering
the stage of industrialization").
7. A. FATOUROS, GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES TO FOREIGN INVESTORS 12-16 (1962).
8. Id.
355
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
not been without its problems. A strong sense of nationalism and a
desire to retain control over natural resources and the means of pro-
duction have caused less developed countries to resort to expropriation
of foreign-owned capital. 9
Until relatively recently, numerous scholars as well as interna-
tional and municipal tribunals, have asserted that a traditional inter-
national norm governs the ability of a state to take the property of
nationals of another state.' 0 This classical standard requires that (1)
the taking be for the public purpose, (2) the taking be nondiscrimi-
natory against aliens, and (3) the state provide prompt and full com-
pensation in an effectively realizable form."I However, in recent
years this norm has been subject to considerable attack, particularly
from the developing nations.12  The bulk of the controversy has cen-
tered on the classical standard's compensation requirement. 3
This note will analyze the continuing viability of the traditional
requirement of paying full compensation. It will conclude that full
compensation is not currently, and indeed never was, the international
standard. Rather, it will be shown that international law grants the
primary responsibility of setting the amount of compensation to the
taking state. Only when the amount of indemnification paid does not
comport with some subjective, ad hoc standard of reasonableness will
international law refuse to defer to the sovereignty of the expropriating
nation. Section II of this note will attempt to narrow the parameters
of the issue by reviewing the positions of various antagonists to the
9. One argument is that foreign ownership of capital in Third World nations is a
form of neo-colonialism which has impeded, rather than promoted, economic development.
The rationale is that any accumulated capital is removed to the developed nation and hence
is not used to develop a domestic industrial infrastructure. See, e.g., RODNEY, supra note
5, at 14, 149; R.J. BARNET & R.E. MULLER, GLOBAL REACH: THE POWER OF THE MUL-
TINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 135 (1974). Accordingly, Third World nations have sought to
attain control of their national wealth. But see Smith, The United States Government Per-
spective on Expropriation and Investment in Developing Countries, 9 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 517, 521 (1976) (asserting that foreign investment is an important source of economic
development in Third World nations).
10. L. OPPENHEIM, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW § 155d, at 351-52 (Lauterpacht 8th ed.
1955); Neville, The Present Status of Compensation by Foreign States for the Taking of
Alien-Owned Property, 13 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 51, 63-66 (1980). The Chorz6w Factory
Case (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J., ser. A., No. 13, at 47 (Judgment of Sept. 13). Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. 375, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), rev'd on other
grounds, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
11. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES §§ 166, 185, 187-190 (1965).
12. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428-30 (1964).
13. See infra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
356 [Vol. 6:355
International Law of Expropriation
dispute. Section III will consider the effect of two United Nations
General Assembly Resolutions on the law of expropriation. Sections
IV and V attempt to extract a rule from an evaluation of treaty law,
which is considered to be the primary means whereby international
law is formed. 14  Section VI will analyze the decisions of interna-
tional tribunals and municipal courts which have been confronted with
the compensation question. Finally, Section VII will review the actual
practice of nations when faced with a nationalization dispute and will
pose the question of whether an international standard is necessary.
II. THE SCOPE OF THE DISPUTE: THE POSITIONS
OF THE PARTIES
In the landmark case of Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,15
the United States Supreme Court declared that "[tlhere are few if any
issues in international law today on which opinion seems to be so
divided as the limitations on a state's power to expropriate the property
of aliens. ' ' 16 This disagreement is not between capital exporting
states; rather it is between industrialized nations and the Third
World. 17  Importantly, the debate does not focus on whether com-
pensation should be paid, but instead centers on how much compen-
sation should be paid.18
The United States' position on the question of expropriation "can
be simply stated: [it] recognize[s] the right of any country to ex-
propriate the property of a United States investor . . . so long as the
taking is non-discriminatory, for a public purpose, and accompanied
14. See, e.g., I OPPENHEIM, supra note 10, § 18, at 27-28. See also infra text
accompanying notes 75-79.
15. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
16. Id. at 428 (footnote omitted).
17. J.M. SWEENEY, C.T. OLIVER, & N.E. LEECH, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM
1183 (2d ed. 1981). See also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 429-30.
18. Muller, Compensation for Nationalization: A North-South Dialogue. 19 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 35, 37 (1981); Neville, supra note 10, at 63. See also The Barcelona
Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 l.C.J. 3, 167 (Jessup, J.. separate
opinion) (in expropriation cases "the issues now turn largely on the measure of compensation").
Muller points out that two related problems exist in the context of the amount of
compensation. The first problem deals with the total amount of liability of the nationalizing
state; that is, whether international law requires full or partial compensation. The second
problem involves valuation, i.e., the various accounting methods employed to estimate the
value of the property. Muller, supra note 18, at 37. This comment will only concern itself
with the first problem. For a good discussion of valuation methods, see Smith, supra note
9.
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by prompt, adequate, and effective compensation.' ' 9 The phrase
"prompt, adequate, and effective compensation" was first expressed
in 1940 by Secretary of State Cordell Hull in a note to the government
of Mexico,20 and has since been referred to as the Hull Doctrine.
Prompt, adequate and effective compensation is essentially the same
as the just (i.e., full) compensation requirement of the fifth amendment
of the United States Constitution.21
Conversely, the Third World's position is that although inter-
national law imposes an obligation on the expropriating state to pro-
vide compensation, the measure of such compensation is governed
entirely by the domestic law of the taking state. 22  This position may
be viewed as a modern invocation of the Calvo Doctrine. 23  Professor
Garcfa-Amador has stated that this doctrine developed in reaction to
the international minimum standard and the principles governing the
treatment of aliens (i.e., the Hull Doctrine),24 which were seen "as
mere tools to satisfy the imperialistic aims and actions of more pow-
erful, developed nations." 25  Capital exporting nations had promul-
gated rules which effectively precluded less developed nations from
expropriating the property of foreign investors, thus assuring them-
selves a source of raw materials. Indeed, Judge Padilla Nervo, writing
separately in the Barcelona Traction case, 26 stated:
The history of the responsibility of States in respect to the treatment
of foreign nationals is the history of abuses, illegal interference
in the domestic jurisdiction of weaker States, unjust claims, threats
and even military aggression under the flag of exercising rights
of protection and the imposing of sanctions in order to oblige a
19. Smith, supra note 9, at 518.
20. 2 DEP'T ST. BULL. 380-81 (1940).
21. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875. 888 (2d Cir.
1981); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
188 (1965).
22. See, e.g., Orrego Vicufia, Some International Law Problems Posed by the Na-
tionalization of the Copper Industry by Chile, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 711, 722 (1973).
23. The Calvo Doctrine states that aliens are entitled to no greater protection than is
accorded to nationals. Garcfa-Amador, The Proposed New International Economic Or-
der: A New Approach to the Law Governing Nationalization and Compensation, 12 LAW.
Am. 1, 2 (1980); Weston, The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States and the
Deprivation of Foreign-Owned Wealth, 75 AM. J. INTL L. 437, 441 n.23 (1981).
24. Garcia-Amador, supra note 23, at 2.
25. Id. at 9. See also Jessup, Non-Universal International Law, 12 COLUM. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 415, 419 (1973).
26. The Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 l.C.J. 3
(Judgment of Sept. 13).
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government to make the reparations demanded.2 7
Accordingly, developing nations maintain that conditions in the
nationalizing state, such as its ability to pay, must be taken into
account when establishing the amount, time and form of compensa-
tion.28 This position has received support from western scholars.
For example, Oppenheim asserts that a state's duty to respect the
property of aliens comes into conflict with its power to expropriate
in situations where it seeks to implement far-reaching social and
economic reforms. Consequently, in such cases, "[i]t is probable
that, consistently with legal principle, [a] solution must be sought in
the granting of partial compensation.' '29
Finally, it has been argued that:
The immense majority of new states did not participate in the
process of formation and development of the numerous juridical
institutions and rules of law that were consolidated and syste-
matized during the nineteenth century. First of all, more than half
of the presently existing states had not yet become independent.
But even the small countries existing at that time did not participate
very actively in this process. The political mechanics of the nine-
teenth century and the concomitant method of creating interna-
tional law, based on the . . recognized supremacy of the states
that formed the Concert of Europe, naturally resulted in according
a comparatively minor role to the smaller states.30
Therefore, since international law obtains its legitimacy from con-
sensus,3 developing states argue that the traditional standard of
compensation 32 is invalid today. Developing states argue that because
they were excluded from the creation of the traditional standard of
compensation and because this standard has subsequently been re-
jected by a large segment of the international community, the tradi-
tional standard of compensation no longer represents the consensual
27. Id. at 246 (Padilla Nervo, J., separate opinion).
28. See Garcia-Amador, supra note 23, at 48-49.
29. I OPPENHEIM, supra note 10, § 155d, at 352.
30. Castafteda, The Underdeveloped Nations and the Development of International
Law, 15 INT'L ORG. 38, 39 (1961).
31. 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 10, §§ 11-12.
32. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text for a discussion of the classical
standard.
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norm of international law. 33
Acknowledging the opposing postions, an examination of the
extent of compensation mandated by international law is now required.
That is, the question of whether international law imposes a certain
level of compensation or whether this issue is exclusively a domestic
matter will be examined.
III. UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS
The ultimate source of international law is the consensus of
nations. 34 One of the primary means of determining international
consent to a particular rule is the custom and practice of na-
tions. 35 While not binding in a statutory sense,3 6 United Nations
General Assembly resolutions are evidence of custom. 37 In recent
decades the General Assembly has adopted two controversial reso-
lutions which deal with expropriation. This section will review their
content and effect on international law.
In December, 1962, the United Nations General Assembly adopted
Resolution 1803 (XVII) on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Re-
sources, which proclaimed, inter alia:
4. Nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning shall be based
on grounds or reasons of public utility, security or the national
interest which are recognized as overriding purely individual or
private interests, both domestic and foreign. In such cases the
owner shall be paid appropriate compensation, in accordance with
the rules in force in the State taking such measures in the exercise
of its sovereignty and in accordance with international law. In
any case where the question of compensation gives rise to a con-
troversy, the national jurisdiction of the State taking such measures
shall be exhausted .... 38
33. No single state can argue that since it did not consent to the creation of a customary
norm, it is not bound by its provisions. 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 10, § 12, at 18. However,
a consensual rule requires "the express or tacit consent of such an overwhelming majority
of the members [of the international community] that those who dissent are of no importance
as compared with the community" as a whole. Id. § I1, at 17. In this regard the Third
World is clearly not an insignificant actor in the community of nations. In fact, it represents
a substantial percentage of the population of the world.
34. 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 10, § 10, at 15-17; 1. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 (3d ed. 1979). ,
35. BROWNLIE, supra note 34, at 2.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 2, 5.
38. G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), 17 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 17) 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217
(1962), reprinted in 2 I.L.M. 223 (1963), 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 710,712 (1963). This resolution
was approved by the General Assembly by a vote of 87 in favor, 2 opposed and 12 abstentions.
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Thus, Resolution 1803 requires that compensation be paid in the event
of an expropriation. Although the measure of such compensation is
to be made "in accordance with the rules in force in the State"
performing the nationalization, the General Assembly clearly did not
intend that the state have exclusive control over the amount of damages
awarded. This intent is evidenced by the phrase "and in accordance
with international law" and the sentence "[i]n any case where the
question of compensation gives rise to a controversy, the national
jurisdiction of the State taking such measures shall be exhausted."
In December, 1974, the United Nations passed Resolution 3281
(XXIX), known as the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States.3 9 It was promulgated by the overwhelming vote of 120 to 6,
with 10 abstentions. 40  Article 2 of the Charter provided:
2. Each State has the right:
(a) To regulate and exercise authority over foreign investment
within its national jurisdiction in accordance with its laws and
regulations and in conformity with its national objectives and
priorities. No State shall be compelled to grant preferential treat-
ment to foreign investment;
(c) To nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership of for-
eign property, in which case appropriate compensation should be
paid by the State adopting such measure, taking into account its
relevant laws and regulations and all circumstances that the State
considers pertinent. In any case where the question of compen-
sation gives rise to a controversy, it shall be settled under the
domestic law of the nationalizing State and by its tribunals, unless
it is freely and mutually agreed by all States concerned that other
peaceful means be sought on the basis of the sovereign equality




The radical nature of the Charter is obvious when its provisions
are compared with those of Resolution 1803. The Charter merely
provides that compensation "should" be paid and is quite explicit in
39. G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 50, U.N. Doc. A/
9631 (1974), reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 251, 254 (1975), 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 484, 487 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as the Charter).
40. 14 I.L.M. at 251 n.*, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. at 484 n.*. Voting against the Charter
were Belgium, Denmark, West Germany, Luxembourg, Great Britain and the United States.
Abstaining were Austria, Canada. France, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands,
Norway and Spain. 14 I.L.M. at 265.
41. The Charter art. 2(2)(a), (c), 14 I.L.M. at 254-55. 69 AM. J. INT'L L. at 487
(emphasis added).
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declaring that the expropriating state has exclusive authority to decide
how much compensation shall be tendered.
42
Consequently, in view of the revolutionary nature of the Charter
as compared to traditional concepts of international expropriation law
as well as Resolution 1801, the question becomes whether the Charter
has modified traditional international law. Several scholars 43 and at
least one international court have recently considered this question.
In Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. v. Libya,44 an arbitration arising
out of Libyan oil nationalizations, the arbitrator, Professor Dupuy,
answered this question in the negative. First, Professor Dupuy noted
that "under Article 10 of the UN Charter, the General Assembly only
issues 'recommendations' . . . having no binding force and carrying
no obligations for the Member States." 45  While acknowledging that
"it is now possible to recognize that resolutions of the United Nations
have a certain legal value,' '46 Dupuy added that this legal value must
be "determined on the basis of circumstances under which they were
adopted and by analysis of the principles which they state . ,'47 He
therefore proceeded to consider these two factors.
In discussing the principles set forth in the Charter, Dupuy dis-
tinguished between resolutions which essentially codify an existing
area of agreement and those which attempt to create a new princi-
ple. 48  He stated that the former "do not create a custom but confirm
one," while the latter are only binding to the extent that they have
been accepted. 49  In this context, Dupuy's analysis of the voting
patterns of the two resolutions became particularly important. He
previously observed that Resolution 1803
was passed by the General Assembly by 87 votes to 2, with 12
abstentions. It is particularly important to note that the majority
voted for this text, including many States of the Third World, but
also several Western developed countries with market economies,
including the most important one, the United States. The prin-
42. Burns H. Weston states that "the repudiation of the principle of compensation as
an international regulatory norm seems a reasonable conclusion." Weston, supra note 23,
at 449 (emphasis in original). Accord Garcia-Amador, supra note 23, at 51.
43. See infra note 61.
44. Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. v. Libya, 53 I.L.R. 389 (1979), reprinted in 17
I.L.M. 1 (1978).
45. Id. at 487, 17 I.L.M. at 28 (citations omitted).
46. Id. at 490, 17 1.L.M. at 29.
47. Id. at 491, 17 I.L.M. at 30.
48. Id. at 491, 17 I.L.M. at 30.
49. Id., 17 I.L.M. at 30.
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ciples stated in this Resolution were therefore assented to by a
great many States representing not only all geographical areas but
also all economic systems.50
From this Dupuy concluded that "consensus by a majority of States
belonging to the various representative groups indicates without the
slightest doubt universal recognition of the rules . . . incorporated [in
Resolution 1803].'1 On the other hand, even though the Charter
was also adopted by a very large majority 5 2 Dupuy emphasized that
"all the industrialized countries with market economies [had] ab-
stained or. . .voted against it."53 This, combined with the fact that
international law is formed in large part by consensus,5 4 substantially
detracted from the notion that the Charter's provisions on compen-
sation were legally binding.
In addition, Dupuy held that to the extent that the Charter pur-
ported to abolish the international minimum standard of compensation,
it conflicted with customary international law.55 To support this con-
clusion, he reasoned that
a great many investment agreements entered into between indus-
trial States or their nationals, on the one hand, and developing
countries, on the other, state, in an objective way, the standards
of compensation and further provide, in case of dispute regarding
the level of such compensation, the possibility of resorting to an
international tribunal.56
In other words, the Charter was deemed inconsistent with international
investment practice, which imposes a compensation requirement and
a duty to submit a dispute to review by an international tribunal.5 7
Finally, Dupuy reviewed the circumstances surrounding the
Charter's adoption. He noted that the Charter was originally proposed
as an attempt to codify and further develop international expropriation
law. Yet, in the face of opposition, the original proposal was
50. Id. at 487, 17 I.L.M. at 28.
51. Id. at 492, 17 I.L.M. at 30.
52. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
53. 53 I.L.R. at 489, 17 I.L.M. at 29.
54. See, e.g., BROWNLIE, supra note 34, at 2; 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 10, § 10, at
15-17.
55. 53 I.L.R. at 493, 17 I.L.M. at 30.
56. Id. at 493, 17 1.L.M. at 30-31.
57. While Dupuy's position is well taken, it is somewhat overstated. Many treaties
are either not objective as to the amount of compensation or specifically subject foreign
investors to the laws of the host country. See infra text accompanying notes 81-94, 96, 99-
107, 135-56, 170-78, 184-86, 189-90, 195-97, 199-201, 203-06, 213, 221.
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dropped.58  Thus, Dupuy declared that "[a]rticle 2 of this Charter
must be analyzed as a political rather than as a legal declaration
''59
Hence, because the provisions of the Charter were deemed con-
trary to many traditional principles of international law, failed to
receive support of a significant sector of the international community,
and were primarily political, Dupuy held that the Charter had not
become law. Furthermore, in view of the universal acceptance of
Resolution 1803, he concluded that it represents the current compen-
sation requirement.
60
Most commentators agree with Professor Dupuy's decision in
Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. that the Charter does not, in itself,
reflect international law. 61 Nevertheless, these scholars have not been
as adamant in rejecting its effect on international legal norms. Rudolf
Dolzer has written that the effect of the Charter "on the process of
changing customary law can only be denied if one assumes that the
votes cast in favor of [this resolution] have no legal character
....'62 In this regard, he noted that "the extensive debates in the
General Assembly have made clear that legal-and not only politi-
cal-views were discussed" prior to adoption of the Charter. 63  Dolzer
maintains that "[m]uch of the writing on the legal effect of General
Assembly resolutions misses [the] point by failing to distinguish be-
tween the derogatory effect on existing rules on the one hand, and
the establishment of new rules on the other."64 Because the contin-
uing validity of a customary norm requires the support of a clear
majority of states, "the conclusion is inescapable that the existence
of the Hull rule as a rule of present law is not sustained by the
prevailing doctrinal opinion within the international community. ' ' 65
It has also been suggested that although the Charter may not be
a binding norm, it is an indicator of the future course of international
58. 53 I.L.R. at 492, 17 I.L.M. at 30.
59. Id. at 492, 17 I.L.M. at 30.
60. Id. at 491-92, 17 I.L.M. at 30.
61. See, e.g., Weston, supra note 23, at 455; Neville, supra note 10, at 62; von
Mehren & Kourides, International Arbitrations Between States and Foreign Private Par-
ties: The Libyan Nationalization Cases, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 476, 526-29 (1981); Brower
& Tepe, The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States: A Reflection or Rejection
of International Law?, 9 INT'L LAW. 295, 300-02 (1975).
62. Dolzer, New Foundations of the Law of Expropriation of Alien Property, 75 AM.
J. INT'L L. 553, 563 (1981).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 564 (footnote omitted).
65. Id. at 565. Accord Neville, supra note 10, at 63.
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law. 66 Indeed, there is historical support for such a conclusion. As-
suming that the Hull Doctrine did at one time represent the interna-
tional rule, the trend toward a greater role of the domestic law of the
nationalizing state in fixing the amount of compensation, and con-
sequently away from a full market value standard, is marked. It is
significant to note that Resolution 1803 did not provide that full
compensation must be paid in the event of an expropriation, but
specified "appropriate compensation" as the require-
ment. 67 Moreover, Resolution 1803 clearly accorded the law of the
taking nation a role in the determination of damages. 68 These two
factors represent a departure from the classical standard of compen-
sation. Building on Resolution 1803, the Charter specified that, un-
less agreed to otherwise, the expropriating country possesses the sole
power to decide the amount of compensation. 69
Assuming that Professor Dupuy was correct in ruling that General
Assembly Resolution 1803 is reflective of current international ex-
propriation law, the question remains as to the meaning of its "ap-
propriate compensation" criterion. It has been suggested that "[i]n
the full context of adoption of General Assembly Resolution 1803
(XVII) the words 'appropriate compensation' could only mean prompt,
adequate and effective compensation."- 70 This contention is inac-
curate. Throughout the debates prior to the passage of Resolution
1803 the United States delegation attempted to incorporate a "prompt,
adequate and effective" definition of compensation into the resolu-
tion. This proposal was met with sharp criticism and eventually the
United States withdrew its proposal. 7' Accordingly, in view of the
widespread knowledge that "prompt, adequate and effective" com-
pensation connotes full compensation, the use of the term "appro-
priate compensation" reflects an understanding that the United Na-
tions rejected the full compensation standard in Resolution
1803.72 The appropriate compensation requirement cannot be char-
acterized as a fixed criterion, rather, as "appropriate" implies, com-
66. Weston, supra note 23, at 455.
67. See supra note 38. For a more detailed discussion of this point, see infra notes
70-74 and accompanying text.
68. See supra text accompanying note 38.
69. See supra text accompanying note 41.
70. Brower & Tepe, supra note 61, at 304.
71. Neville, supra note 10, at 68-69; Orrego Vicufia, supra note 22, at 722-23.
72. That Resolution 1803 does not mandate full compensation has also been acknowl-
edged by the American Law Institute. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RE-
LATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 188 reporter's note 1, at 566-67 (1965).
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pensation that is fair and reasonable given the circumstances of the
taking is mandated. 73  This interpretation of Resolution 1803 cor-
responds precisely with the contention of many Third World nations
regarding the international compensation standard. 74
IV. UNITED STATES TREATIES
Treaties are the most important source of international law to-
day. 75  Certain treaties, which lay down general rules of conduct and
are subscribed to by the vast majority of states, are called law making
treaties and may directly create a rule of law. 76  In addition, treaties
are evidence of custom, 77 which has traditionally been the primary
source of international law. 78  Stipulations in bilateral treaties, if
sufficiently numerous and uniform in their requirements, may become
rules of customary international law . 79  Accordingly, this section will
examine United States treaties to determine their effect on international
custom, and the next section will review treaties to which the United
States is not a party.
Over the past two hundred years American treaty practice re-
garding property protection in general and expropriation in particular
has undergone a substantial transformation. The trend has been to-
ward an increasingly greater focus on expropriation. In addition, the
standards governing expropriation of foreign-owned property have
evolved from rather vague provisions to much greater specificity.
These treaties may be classified into three chronological pe-
riods: pre-1923, 1923 to the Second World War, and from the end
of World War II to the present.
73. See Orrego Vicufia, supra note 22, at 723; Weston, supra note 23, at 488 n.54;
Murphy, Limitations Upon the Power of a State to Determine the Amount of Compensation
Payable to an Alien Upon Nationalization, in 3 THE VALUATION OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 49, 52 (R.B. Lillich ed. 1972).
74. See supra text accompanying note 28.
75. 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 10, § 18, at 27.
76. Id. § 18, at 28 & § 492, at 878-80. Cf. I.C.J. STATUTE art. 38 (1)(a).
77. BROWNLIE, supra note 34, at 5, 13-14. See Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v.
Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4, 22-23 (Judgment of Apr. 6) (U.S. bilateral treaty practice cited as
evidence of international practice); The Panevezys-Saldutiskis Rwy Case (Estonia v. Lithuania),
1939 P.C.I.J. ser. A/B, No. 76, at 51-52 (Judgment of Feb. 28) (Erich, J., dissenting)
(citing exhaustion of local remedies as a customary rule developed by common treaty practice).
78. 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 10, § 17, at 25-26.
79. BROWNLIE, supra note 34, at 13-14. Cf. The State (Duggan) v. Tapley, 18 I.L.R.
336, 337-39 (Ir. 1950) (the political crime exception in extradition treaties held insufficiently
uniform to constitute a rule of customary international law).
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A. The Pre-1923 Period
Prior to 1923 American treaties rarely referred to the problem
of expropriation. In fact, the issue was dealt with in only six instances.
The American treaties with Nicaragua and El Salvador stated that no
property shall be taken "without full and just compensation
.... ,"80 However, treaties with the Swiss Confederation and the
Orange Free State merely required that the taking nation place citizens
of the other state on an equal footing with its own citizens with
"respect to indemnities for damages they may have sus-
tained. "8 The treaty with the Congo provided that property "shall
not be taken . . . without an ample and sufficient compensa-
tion." 82 Finally, an 1868 treaty with China declared that the eminent
domain power of China was not relinquished. 83  While this last com-
pact did not concern substantive questions of such power, its wording
indicates that whatever the Chinese eminent domain law may have
been at the time, its substance remained intact. In effect, an expro-
priation would be governed by domestic Chinese law.
None of the more than ninety remaining commercial treaties the
United States entered into prior to 1923 directly involved the question
of expropriation.8 4  However, as R.R. Wilson notes, "[o]ver the
period beginning with the signing of a treaty with The Netherlands
on Oct. 8, 1782, and ending with the treaty with Ethiopia, signed
Dec. 27, 1903, the United States in twenty-eight agreements included
provisions against seizures or detentions, sometimes in relation to
embargoes." 85 Three of these treaties, with the Netherlands, Sweden
and Spain, provide that seizures and detentions of ships or their goods,
80. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, June 21, 1867, United States-
Nicaragua, art. IX(3), 18(2) Stat. 566, 569; Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Consular
Privileges, Dec. 6, 1870, United States-Republic of Salvador, art. XXIX, 18(3) Stat. 725,
740.
81. Convention of Friendship, Commerce and Extradition, Nov. 25, 1850, United
States-Swiss Confederation, art. 1I, 18(2) Stat. 748, 749; Convention of Friendship, Com-
merce and Extradition, Dec. 22, 1871, United States-Orange Free State, art. 11, J8(2) Stat.
580.
82. Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, Jan. 24, 1891, United States-Congo,
art. III, 27 Stat. 926, 928.
83. Additional Articles to the Treaty of June 18, 1858, July 28, 1868, United States-
China, art. 1, 18(2) Stat. 147.
84. A chronological listing of all commercial treaties concluded by the United States
from 1778 to 1960 may be found in R.R. WILSON, UNITED STATES COMMERCIAL TREATIES
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 331-34 Appendix 1 (1960).
85. Id. at 107 (footnotes omitted).
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"must be by way of law, according to the forms of justice. ' ' 6  The
remainder of these provisions essentially follow a standard format.
The 1824 convention with Colombia is typical. "The citizens of
neither of the contracting parties shall be liable to any embargo, nor
be detained with their vessels, cargoes, merchandises, or effects, for
any military expedition, nor for any public or private purpose what-
ever, without allowing those interested a sufficient indemnifica-
tion.''87 An 1831 treaty with Mexico calls for "corresponding
compensation" 88 while four other treaties require either "equitable"
or "equitable and sufficient" indeinnification. 89 However, three dif-
ferent compacts with Peru and one with Bolivia call for "full and
sufficient indemnification. " 90
These provisions derive their importance from the fact that they
deal with detentions and seizures, albeit of ships and their cargoes.
Nevertheless, with the exception of the Bolivian and the three Peruvian
treaties, none of the remaining twenty-four treaties specify according
to what standards "sufficient" indemnity is to be determined. How-
ever, one final relevant principle may be extracted from pre-1923
American treaties. While these compacts uniformly provide for the
protection of foreign property rights and freedom of trade and com-
merce, in over forty-five agreements foreigners were explicitly sub-
jected to domestic laws and regulations. 9' One of the first of these
agreements, the July 3, 1815 Convention for the Regulation of Com-
merce with Great Britain, is typical. "[T]he merchants and traders
86. Treaty of Amity and Commerce, Oct. 8, 1782, United States-the Netherlands,
art. VIII, 18(2) Stat. 533, 535. See Treaty of Amity and Commerce, Apr. 3, 1783, United
States-Sweden, art. XVII, 18(2) Stat. 722, 726-27; Treaty of Friendship, Limits and Nav-
igation, Oct. 27, 1795, United States-China, art. XX, 18(2) Stat. 704, 709-10.
87. Convention of Peace, Amity, Navigation and Commerce, Oct. 3, 1824, United
States-Colombia, art. V, 18(2) Stat. 150, 151 (emphasis added).
88. Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, Apr. 5, 1831, United States-Mexico,
art. VIII, 18(2) Stat. 476, 478.
89. Treaty of Amity and Commerce, July 1I, 1799, United States-Prussia, art. XVI,
18(2) Stat. 648, 653; Treaty of Peace, Amity, Navigation and Commerce, Dec. 13, 1846,
United States-New Granada, art. VIII, 18(2) Stat. 550, 552; Treaty of Amity, Navigation
and Commerce, Jan. 2, 1850, United States-San Salvador, art. VIII, 18(2) Stat. 675, 677;
Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Consular Privileges, Dec. 6, 1870, United States-Republic
of Salvador, art. VIII, 18(3) Stat. 725, 729.
90. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, July 26, 1851, United States-
Peru, art. II, 18(2) Stat. 612, 613; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Aug.
31, 1887, United States-Peru, art. I1, 25 Stat. 1444, 1445-46; Treaty of Friendship, Com-
merce and Navigation, Sept. 6, 1870, United States-Peru, art. 11, 18(3) Stat. 698, 699;
Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, May 13, 1858, United States-
Bolivia, art. III, 18(2) Stat. 68, 69.
91. See infra Appendix A for a listing of these treaties.
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of each nation respectively shall enjoy the most complete protection
and security for their commerce, but subject always to the laws and
statutes" of the other. 92  Indeed, the 1860 treaty with Venezuela and
two subsequent accords with other Latin American nations declare
that it is "distinctly understood" that foreigners are subject to do-
mestic laws regarding business activities. 93 In addition, an 1833
agreement with Chile specified that the rights of American citizens
are protected to the full extent of Chilean law, "but no special favors
or privileges" were to be granted. 9
4
Two propositions may be abstracted from these early United
States treaties. First, as noted above, 95 international law has tradi-
tionally required the payment of full compensation upon an expro-
priation of an alien's property. However, no support for this so-called
classical norm is present in early American treaties. Indeed, these
treaties rarely dealt with the problem of expropriation and those that
did are at best inconclusive as to a standard of compensa-
tion. 96  Second, it is arguable that far from creating a full compen-
sation requirement, pre-1923 United States treaties support the po-
sition that indemnification is to be determined by the domestic laws
of the taking nation. Although it was generally specified that the
property of foreigners shall be protected, it is also clear that this
property was subject to the laws of the state where it was situ-
ated. 97  As several conventions with Latin American countries em-
phasized, aliens were not entitled to any greater protection than that
accorded to natives. 98
B. The 1923 to World War H Period
During the period from 1923 to the Second World War the United
States entered into twelve commercial treaties which dealt with the
92. Convention for the Regulation of Commerce, July 3, 1815, United States-Great
Britain, art. 1, 18(2) Stat. 292, 293.
93. Treaty of Amity, Commerce, Navigation and Extradition, Aug. 27, 1860, United
States-Venezuela, art. Ill, 18(2) Stat. 797, 798; Treaty of Amity, Commerce, Navigation
and Extradition, Nov. 3, 1864, United States-Hayti, art. VI, 18(2) Stat. 412, 413; Convention
of Amity, Commerce, Navigation and Extradition, Feb. 8, 1867, United States-Dominican
Republic, art. 111, 18(2) Stat. 178, 179.
94. Additional and Explanatory Convention to the Treaty of Amity, Commerce and
Navigation of May 16, 1832, Sept. 1, 1833, United States-Chili, art. 11, 18(2) Stat. 112,
113.
95. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
96. Indeed, an argument may be made that they provided that the law of the taking
nation governed the amount of compensation. See supra text accompanying notes 80-83.
97. See supra notes 84-92 and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
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issue of nationalization. 99 The first of these, the compact with
Germany, used language which is virtually identical in each of the
others:
The nationals of each High Contracting Party shall receive within
the territories of the other, upon submitting to conditions imposed
upon its nationals, the most constant protection and security for
their persons and property, and shall enjoy in this respect that
degree of protection that is required by international law. Their
property shall not be taken without due process of law and without
payment of just compensation. '00
The due process requirement in these treaties does not refer to the
due process requirement of the United States Constitution, but to the
due process required by international law. 0 1 Consequently, these
treaties merely require adherence to the nebulous concepts of inter-
national due process and just compensation. The vagueness of these
terms could result in varying interpretations of what amount of com-
pensation is "just" and how much process is due. Indeed, one com-
mentator states that" [r]eference to 'just compensation' lacks precision
and accordingly could result in quite different assertions as to the
methods used in determining the valuation of prop-
erty."10 2  Therefore, other than helping to establish an international
requirement of at least some compensation, this set of treaties is of
99. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights, Dec. 8, 1923, United
States-Germany, art. I, 44 Stat. 2132, 2133-34, T.S. No. 725; Treaty of Friendship, Com-
merce and Consular Rights, June 24, 1925, United States-Hungary, art. 1, 44 Stat. 2441,
2441-42, T.S. No. 748; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights, Dec. 23,
1925, United States-Estonia, art. I, 44 Stat. 2379, 2379-80, T.S. No. 736; Treaty of Friend-
ship, Commerce and Consular Rights, Feb. 22, 1926, United States-El Salvador, art. I, 46
Stat. 2817, 2818-19, T.S. No. 827; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights,
Dec. 7, 1927, United States-Honduras, art. 1, 45 Stat. 2618, 2618-20, T.S. No. 764; Treaty
of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights, Apr. 20, 1928, United States-Latvia, art. 1,
45 Stat. 2641, 2641-42, T.S. No. 765; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights,
June 5, 1928, United States-Norway, art. I, 47 Stat. 2135, 2136-37, T.S. No. 852; Treaty
of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights, June 19, 1928, United States-Austria, art.
I, 47 Stat. 1876, 1877-78, T.S. No. 838; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular
Rights, June 15, 1931, United States-Poland, art. I, 48 Stat. 1507, 1508-10, T.S. No. 862;
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights, Feb. 13, 1934, United States-Finland,
art. I, 49 Stat. 2659, 2660-61, T.S. No. 868; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navi-
gation, Nov. 13, 1937, United States-Siam, art. I, 53 Stat. 1731, 1731-32, T.S. No. 940;
Treaty .of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Aug. 8, 1938, United States-Liberia, art.
1, 54 Stat. 1739, 1939-40, T.S. No. 956.
100. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights, Dec. 8, 1923, United
States-Germany, art. I, 44 Stat. 2132, 2133-34, T.S. No. 725.
101. WILSON, supra note 84, 115.
102. Piper, International Investment Law, 4 INT'L TRADE L.J. 315, 333 (1978).
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little value in resolving the extent of such remuneration. However,
by employing accepted methods of treaty interpretation some light
may perhaps be shed on the subject.
One such method is the application of the ordinary meaning'03
of the term "just" compensation which would connote an ad hoc and
equitable computation of remuneration rather than a fixed standard
of full compensation. Another means of interpreting treaties is the
integration principle. 104 Under this approach the meaning of terms
are determined by examining the treaty as whole, 10 5 or a particular
article thereof,'0 6 and not merely to the particular phrase in question.
With this in mind, it must be noted that the articles in these treaties
which deal with expropriation and property protection require, as a
condition for such protection, submission to the conditions imposed
on nationals.107  This clause, when read with the "just compensa-
tion" clause, suggests that the amount of compensation shall be the
same as that paid to nationals, but must always meet some international
minimum standard of justice.
C. The Post World War II Period
Since the Second World War the United States has concluded
twenty-four bilateral treaties which address the issue of expropriation.
These treaties are different from their pre-War counterparts in one
important respect: they have tended to be precise as to the standard
of compensation. Four treaties signed between 1946 and 1951, with
the Republic of China, 18 Italy,' °9 Ireland,"10 and Ethiopia, I ' call for
"the prompt payment of just and effective compensation" in the event
103. See BROWNLIE, supra note 34, at 624. See also Competence of the General
Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations, 1950 I.C.J. 4, 8 (Advisory
Opinion of Mar. 3) (the natural and ordinary meaning of words should be the primary method
of treaty interpretation).
104. BROWNLIE, supra note 34, 624.
105. The Competence of the International Labour Organization to Regulate Agricultural
Labour, 1922 P.C.I.J., ser. B, No. 2, at 23 (Advisory Opinion of Aug. 12).
106. Case of the Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex (Fr. v. Switz.),
1932 P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 46, at 140 (Judgment of June 7).
107. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
108. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Nov. 4, 1946, United States-
Republic of China, art. VI(2), 63 Stat. 1299, T.I.A.S. No. 1871, 25 U.N.T.S. 69, 98.'
109. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Feb. 2, 1948, United States-
Italy, art. V(2), 63 Stat. 2255, 2262, T.I.A.S. No. 1965, 79 U.N.T.S. 171, 178.
110. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Jan. 21, 1950, United States-
Ireland, art. VIII(2), 1 U.S.T. 785, 792-93, T.I.A.S. No. 2155, 206 U.N.T.S. 269, 278.
111. Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations, Sept. 7, 1951, United States-Ethiopia,
art. VIII(2), 4 U.S.T. 2134, 2141, T.I.A.S. No. 2864, 206 U.N.T.S. 60, 68.
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of an expropriation of property owned by a foreign national. While
this standard is fairly vague and therefore capable of varying inter-
pretations, its similarity with the Hull Doctrine, which calls for
"prompt, adequate and effective compensation," is nota-
ble." 2  Thus, it is also possible that full market value was intended
as the measure of compensation.
However, beginning in 1951 with the Treaty of Friendship, Com-
merce and Navigation with Greece,1 3 United States treaties required
full compensation to be paid. The third paragraph of article VII of
the Greek treaty provides:
Property of nationals and companies of either Party shall not be
taken within the territories of the other Party except for public
benefit, nor shall it be taken without the prompt payment of just
compensation. Such compensation shall be in an effectively re-
alizable form and shall represent the full equivalent of the property
taken .... 114
This language was repeated almost verbatim in all but two of the
subsequent treaties.' '5 Of the remaining two treaties, one is a 1975
112. As noted above the "prompt, adequate and effective" standard of the Hull Doctrine
is synonymous with full market value. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
113. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Aug. 3, 1951, United States-
Greece, 5 U.S.T. 1829, T.I.A.S. No. 3057, 224 U.N.T.S. 300.
114. Id. art. VIII(3), 5 U.S.T. at 1845-47, 224 U.N.T.S. at 306 (emphasis added).
115. See Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Aug. 23, 1951, United
States-Israel, art. VI(3), 5 U.S.T. 550, 556, T.1.A.S. No. 2948, 219 U.N.T.S. 252, 258;
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Oct. 1, 1951, United States-Denmark, art.
VI(3), 12 U.S.T. 908, 913-14, T.I.A.S. No. 4797, 421 U.N.T.S. 105, 110; Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, United States-Japan, art. Vl(3), 4
U.S.T. 2063, 2068-69, T.I.A.S. No. 2863, 206 U.N.T.S. 192, 198; Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation, Oct. 29, 1954, United States-Federal Republic of Germany, art.
V(4), 7 U.S.T. 1839, 1844, T.I.A.S. No. 3593, 273 U.N.T.S. 3, 8; Treaty of Amity,
Economic Relations and Consular Rights, Aug. 15, 1955, United States-Iran, art. IV(2), 8
U.S.T. 899, 903, T.I.A.S. No. 3853, 284 U.N.T.S. 110, 114; Treaty of Friendship, Com-
merce and Navigation, Jan. 21, 1956, United States-Nicaragua, art. VI(4), 9 U.S.T. 449,
454, T.I.A.S. No. 4024, 367 U.N.T.S. 3, 8-10; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation, Mar. 27, 1956, United States-Netherlands, art. VI(4), 8 U.S.T. 2043, 2051,
T.I.A.S. No. 3942, 285 U.N.T.S. 231, 239; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navi-
gation, Nov. 28, 1956, United States-Republic of Korea, art. VI(4), 8 U.S.T. 2217, 2221-
22, T.I.A.S. No. 3947, 302 U.N.T.S. 304, 310; Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and
Consular Rights, Dec. 20, 1958, United States-Muscat and Oman, art. IV(2), 11 U.S.T.
1835, 1837, T.1.A.S. No. 4530, 380 U.N.T.S. 196, 198-200; Treaty of Friendship and
Commerce, Nov. 12, 1959, United States-Pakistan, art. VI(4), 12 U.S.T. 110, 113, T.1.A.S.
No. 4683, 404 U.N.T.S. 259, 264-66; Treaty of Establishment, Nov. 25, 1959, United
States-France, art. IV(3), 11 U.S.T. 2398, 2402-03, T.I.A.S. No. 4625, 401 U.N.T.S. 75,
78-80; Treaty of Friendship, Establishment and Navigation, Feb. 21, 1961, United States-
Belgium, art. IV(3), 14 U.S.T. 1284, 1291, T.I.A.S. No. 5432, 480 U.N.T.S. 149, 157;
Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations, Apr. 3, 1961, United States-Republic of Viet-
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Agreement of Trade Relations with Romania, which states that assets
will not be "expropriated without the payment of prompt, adequate
and effective compensation."1 6  In light of the specific language in
the other eighteen treaties 1951, it is perhaps significant that this
agreement failed to expressly require full compensation. Neverthe-
less, its use of the exact wording of the Hull Doctrine cannot rea-
sonably lead to a conclusion other than an obligation to provide for
full compensation.
The only other treaty since 1951 which does not call for full
compensation is the Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations signed
on May 29, 1966 with Thailand."17  Article 111(2) of this treaty re-
quires that an expropriation be accompanied by the "payment of just
compensation in accordance with the principles of international
law."' 8  This treaty, therefore, represents a reversion to the vague
language of the 1923 to World War II period. 1' 9
It is necessary to consider the impact of post-War United States
treaty practice on international legal norms. As noted previously,1
2 0
bilateral treaties are an important source of international law in that
they reflect custom and consensus. It would therefore appear that the
post-War treaties lend strong support to the argument that full com-
pensation is mandated by customary international law. However, the
persuasiveness of these treaties is substantially diminished by an anal-
ysis of the nations involved. Of the twenty-three treaties that support
or tend to support full compensation (this includes the four that re-
quired "prompt payment of just and effective compensation"), eleven
were with various west European nations, Japan and
Nam, art. IV(2), 12 U.S.T. 1703, 1707, T.1.A.S. No. 4890, 424 U.N.T.S. 150, 154; Treaty
of Friendship, Establishment and Navigation, Feb. 23, 1962, United States-Luxembourg,
art. IV(3), 14 U.S.T. 251, 255, T.I.A.S. No. 5306, 474 U.N.T.S. 3, 10; Treaty of Amity
and Economic Relations, Feb. 8, 1966, United States-Togo, art. iV(2), 18 U.S.T. 1, 4,
T.I.A.S. No. 6193, 680 U.N.T.S. 159, 164; Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encourage-
ment and Protection of Investments, Sept. 29, 1982, United States-Egypt, art. 111(l), 21
I.L.M. 927, 935; Treaty Concerning the Treatment and Protection of Investment, Oct. 27,
1982, United States-Panama, art. IV(I), 21 I.L.M. 1227, 1231-32.
116. Agreement on Trade Relations, Apr. 2, 1975, United States-Romania, Joint State-
ment on Economic, Industrial and Technological Cooperation, para. 5, 26 U.S.T. 2305,
2345, T.I.A.S. No. 8159.
117. Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations, May 29, 1966, United States-Thailand,
19 U.S.T. 5843, T.I.A.S. No. 6540, 652 U.N.T.S. 253.
118. Id. art. Ill(2), 19 U.S.T. at 5847, 652 U.N.T.S. at 272.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 99-102.
120. See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
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Israel.' Significantly, ten of these eleven countries abstained or
voted against the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States.' 22 In addition, seven of the remaining twelve were with na-
tions which, at the time the treaty was signed, were U.S. client
states.2 3 The only treaties with non-aligned Third World nations
were those with Ethiopia, Oman, Pakistan and Togo. 2 4  Of these
the treaty with Ethiopia was within the group of ambiguous treaties
which were concluded shortly after the Second World War. 125  Finally,
the Trade Agreement with Romania was the only one with a socialist-
bloc nation. When viewed from this perspective it is clear that post-
War United States treaties simply do not have the necessary breadth
to establish a customary rule of law. That is, there is insufficient
consent to provide full compensation from Third World nations. A
customary rule of international law requires either the express or tacit
consent of the vast majority of nations. 12 6
It is apparent that United States treaties before the Second World
War do not support the conclusion that international law requires the
payment of full compensation in the event of a nationalization of
foreign-owned property. To the extent that international law is created
by treaties, the notion that there existed a traditional norm which
required full compensation 127 is not supported by early United States
treaties. Rather, if any rule may be derived from these compacts it
is that the amount of damages is a matter of the domestic law of the
expropriating state. If this was the international rule prior to the
Second World War, recent United States practice has not gathered
sufficient world-wide support to repudiate it and establish a full com-
pensation requirement in its place.
V. NON-UNITED STATES TREATIES SINCE WORLD WAR I
The treaty practice of foreign nations dealing with the issue of
expropriation has also witnessed a substantial change in recent de-
121. These eleven nations were: Belgium, Denmark, France, West Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. See supra notes 109-10 &
113-15.
122. Compare supra note 121 with supra note 40.
123. These seven nations were: The Republic of China (Taiwan), Egypt, Iran, South
Korea, Nicaragua, Panama and South Vietnam. See supra notes 108 & 115.
124. See supra notes Ill & 115.
125. See supra text accompanying note Ill.
126. See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text for a discussion of this traditional
norm.
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cades. Since the First World War the requirements of expropriation
provisions in non-United States treaties have varied depending on the
era in which the treaty was concluded. Three historical periods are
evident from a review of treaty practice concerning property taking.
During the first period, between the First and Second World Wars,
treaties tended to require only that the taking state pay foreigners the
same amount of compensation as that paid to its own nationals and/
or nationals of the most-favored nation. 128 The years from World
War II until the early 1960's were a time of emergent change. Most
of the treaties signed in this period followed the inter-War ap-
proach. 129 However, several specified more ambiguous standards,
such as "just" compensation or adherence to international
law. 30  Several also required full compensation.' 3' Since the early
1960's, almost all of the treaties concluded between foreign countries
have required either full remuneration 3 2 or a more vague standard of
"effective and adequate" indemnification in accordance with inter-
national law.'33  Only a very few treaties have required treatment no
less favorable than that accorded to nationals. 134
A. The Inter-War Period
The expropriation provisions of treaties signed between the First
and Second World Wars fall into three categories. By far the largest
of these groups consists of treaties which either specified national
treatment, 3 5 most-favored nation treatment 3 6 or both' 137 with respect
128. See infra notes 135-69 and accompanying text.
129. See infra notes 170-74 and accompanying text.
130. See infra notes 175-78 and accompanying text.
131. See infra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
132. See infra notes 181-83, 191-94, 198, 202, 207-12, 214-16, 218-20 and accom-
panying text.
133. See infra notes 184-86, 189-90, 195-97, 199-201, 203-06, 213, 221 and accom-
panying text.
134. See infra notes 187-88, 217, 222 and accompanying text.
135. Agreement Concerning Conditions of Residence, Business and Legal Protection
in General, Aug. 3, 1926, Germany-U.S.S.R., art. 8 and Additional to art. 8, 53 L.N.T.S.
85, 89, 93, 149; Convention Regarding Conditions of Residence and Business, May 31,
1927, Turkey-Czechoslovakia, art. 7, 75 L.N.T.S. 79, 85; Convention Regarding Conditions
of Residence and Legal Protection, Dec. 1, 1927, Greece-Switzerland, art. 7, 84 L.N.T.S.
271, 275; Convention of Commerce and Navigation, Aug. 22, 1928, Denmark-Greece, art.
2, 94 L.N.T.S. 263, 267; Convention Regarding Conditions of Residence, Feb. 17, 1929,
Germany-Persia, art. 9, 111 L.N.T.S. 258, 260; Treaty of Establishment, Commerce and
Navigation, May 10, 1929, Sweden-Persia, art. 7, 102 L.N.T.S. 9, 15; Treaty of Commerce
and Navigation, Aug. 12, 1929, Finland-Turkey, art. 6, 96 L.N.T.S. 239, 243; Commercial
Convention, June 3, 1930, Greece-Hungary, art. 2, 122 L.N.T.S. 37, 41; Treaty of Estab-
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to expropriation of foreign-owned property. For example, article 7
of a May 10, 1929 treaty between Sweden and Persia provided that
"[t]he nationals of either of the Contracting States may not be ex-
propriated or deprived even temporarily of the enjoyment of their
property, except under the conditions and on payment of the com-
pensation prescribed by the local law in respect of nation-
als."' 38  Similarly, the Treaty of Friendship, Establishment and
Commerce of February 20, 1934 between Denmark and Persia stated
that neither party would expropriate the property of the nationals of
the other "except under the conditions and in return for the compen-
sation stipulated by the local law in regard to nationals of the most-
favoured nation. "' 139
lishment, Commerce and Navigation, Mar. 16, 1931, Norway-Turkey, art. 6, 138 L.N.T.S.
41, 47; Convention Respecting Conditions of Residence, Aug. 29, 1931, Poland-Turkey,
art. 7, 144 L.N.T.S. 367, 373; Convention of Commerce and Navigation, Dec. 14, 1934,
Spain-Poland, art. 1, 168 L.N.T.S. 315, 317; Treaty of Establishment, Apr. 7, 1937, Egypt-
Turkey, art. 7, 191 L.N.T.S. 95, 99; Treaty of Establishment, Commerce and Navigation,
May 13, 1937, Romania-Yugoslavia, art. 3, 197 L.N.T.S. 145, 147-79; Commercial Con-
vention, Jan. 12, 1938, Latvia-Turkey, art. 6, 201 L.N.T.S. 229, 233.
136. Treaty of Commerce, Oct. 31, 1925, Italy-Germany, art. 6, 52 L.N.T.S. 311,
315; Convention Concerning Conditions of Residency, Oct. 6, 1927, Belgium-France, art.
3, 69 L.N.T.S. 49, 51-53; Convention of Commerce and Navigation, May 28, 1928, Latvia-
Turkey, art. 6, 94 L.N.T.S. 295, 299; Convention of Commerce, Navigation and Estab-
lishment, Mar. 11, 1929, France-Greece, art. 21,95 L.N.T.S. 401,417; Commercial Agree-
ment, Mar. 15, 1929, Estonia-France, art. 18, 89 L.N.T.S. 381, 391; Treaty of Friendship,
Establishment and Commerce, Feb. 20, 1934, Denmark-Persia, art. 5, 158 L.N.T.S. 299,
303; Convention of Establishment, Apr. 25, 1934, Switzerland-Persia, art. 9, 160 L.N.T.S.
173, 179-81; Treaty of Establishment, Commerce and Navigation, Aug. 27, 1935, Iran-
U.S.S.R., art. 3, 176 L.N.T.S. 299, 303.
137. Treaty Concerning the Establishment of Economic Relations, June 28, 1926,
Germany-Latvia, art. 1(6), 58 L.N.T.S. 417, 419-21; Treaty of Commerce and Navigation,
Mar. 24, 1928, Germany-Greece, art. 7, 90 L.N.T.S. 79, 81-83; Treaty of Commerce and
Navigation, Oct. 30, 1928, Germany-Lithuania, art. 5, 89 L.N.T.S. 149, 151-52; Convention
of Establishment, Aug. 27, 1930, France-Romania, art. 2, 158 L.N.T.S. 379, 383; Con-
vention Regarding Establishment and Navigation, Feb. 20, 1933, Belgium-Netherlands, art.
8, §§ 4-5, 165 L.N.T.S. 404, 407-08; Convention of Establishment and Labour, Apr. 1,
1933, Luxembourg-Netherlands, art. 8, §§ 3-4, 179 L.N.T.S. 31, 34-35; Convention Con-
cerning the Rights of Nationals and Commercial and Shipping Matters, May 12, 1933,
Canada-France, art. 3, 253 U.N.T.S. 285, 288; Convention Regarding Conditions of Res-
idence and Business, July 9, 1933, Romania-Switzerland, art. 6, 152 L.N.T.S. 89, 93;
Treaty Concerning the Treatment of Nationals, Companies, Co-operative Societies and As-
sociations of the Other Country, May 7, 1935, Finland-Switzerland, art. 4, 166 L.N.T.S.
35, 39; Convention of Establishment, Nov. 5, 1937, Belgium-Siam, art. 5, §§ 4-5, 190
L.N.T.S. 163, 169.
138. Treaty of Establishment, Commerce and Navigation, May 10, 1929, Sweden-
Persia, art. 7, 102 L.N.T.S. 9, 15.
139. Treaty of Friendship, Establishment and Commerce, Feb. 20, 1934, Denmark-
Persia, art. 5, 158 L.N.T.S. 299, 303.
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The effect of provisions stipulating national and/or most-favored
nation treatment is the same. Both allow the taking state to decide
the amount of compensation. This is so because a nation determines
how to treat its own nationals as well as what treatment will be
accorded to citizens of the most-favored nation. Therefore, as long
as the expropriating legislation does not treat the nationals of the other
signatory power worse than its own citizens (or citizens of any other
nation), no violation of the treaty has occurred. Indeed, one com-
mentator, writing in the 1930's, stated that a rule of parity with
nationals would mean "that if nationals receive no compensation,
none need be accorded to aliens."140 A corollary of this would be
that if citizens of the most-favored nation receive no compensation,
none need be accorded to nationals of a country with a treaty with
the taking state which merely requires most-favored nation treatment.
Very closely related to this first group are a number of treaties
which, while not specifically mentioning expropriation, require either
national' 4' or most-favored nation 42 treatment or both 43 with respect
to requisitions. 44 For example, a 1930 convention between Greece
and Turkey stated that the citizens of each state, in the territory of
the other, shall not be subjected to "military or civil requisitions other
than those imposed on nationals or companies of the other High
140. Cutler, The Treatment of Foreigners, 27 AM. J. INT'L L. 225, 232 (1933).
141. Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, Oct. 29, 192 1, Esthonia-Finland, art. 2, 13
L.N.T.S. 119, 119-21; Commercial Treaty, Dec. 14, 1923. Austria-Belgo-Luxembourg
Economic Union, art. 5, 29 L.N.T.S. 37, 41; Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, Nov.
7, 1924, Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union-Guatemala, art. 6, 69 L.N.T.S. 17, 23; Treaty
of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, June 8. 1925, Netherlands-Siam, art. 5, 56
L.N.T.S. 57, 61; Treaty of Commerce, Oct. 19, 1925, Austria-China, art. 4, 55 L.N.T.S.
19, 21; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, July 13, 1926, Belgo-Luxembourg
Economic Union-Siam, art. 3, 62 L.N.T.S. 287, 291; Treaty of Commerce, May 31, 1927,
Czechoslovakia-Hungary, art. 6, 65 L.N.T.S. 61, 67; Treaty of Commerce, May 17, 1929,
Estonia-U.S.S.R., art. 3, 94 L.N.T.S. 323, 327; Convention of Establishment, Commerce
and Navigation, Oct. 30, 1930, Greece-Turkey, art. 9, 125 L.N.T.S. 371. 379.
142. Convention Concerning Conditions of Residence, Business and Consular Matters,
Aug. 21, 1924, Italy-Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, art. 5, 82 L.N.T.S. 445,
451; Convention of Commerce and Navigation, Dec. 22, 1924, Latvia-Sweden, art. 5, 36
L.N.T.S. 383, 385.
143. Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, Nov. 23, 1937. Great Britain-Siam, art.
1(5), 188 L.N.T.S. 333, 336-38.
144. A large group of treaties deal specifically with only military requisitions. These
treaties have been excluded from the present discussion because of the dissimilarity between
a military requisition and a civil expropriation. A requisition for a military purpose is directly
tied to the national security. The notion that an alien should receive more favorable treatment
than a national is much weaker when the taking is for the paramount purpose of the national
security. The treaties cited in supra notes 142-43 are not limited to purely military requisitions.
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Contracting Party. As regards the procedure in connection with and
compensation for such requisitions, they shall be subject to local
legislation as in the case of nationals of the country." 145 Although
these treaties do not expressly deal with expropriation, the similarity
between expropriation and requisition, particularly civil requisition,
leaves little doubt that the former concept was included within the
latter. Indeed, in many of the treaties in the first group, expropriation
and requisition were dealt with together. 146  Thus, it is clear that the
two concepts are considered analogous.
The final group of treaties of the inter-War period which deal
with expropriation contain provisions which call for either "fair,' 147
145. Convention of Establishment. Commerce and Navigation, Oct. 30, 1930, Greece-
Turkey, art. 9, 125 L.N.T.S. 371, 379.
146. See Agreement Concerning Conditions of Residence, Business and Legal Protec-
tion in General, Aug. 3, 1926, Germany-U.S.S.R., art. 8 and Additional to art. 8, 53
L.N.T.S. 85, 89, 93, 149; Treaty of Commerce, Oct. 31, 1925, Italy-Germany, art. 6, 52
L.N.T.S. 311, 315; Commercial Agreement, Mar. 15. 1929, Estonia-France. art. 18, 89
L.N.T.S. 381, 391; Treaty Concerning the Establishment of Economic Relations, June 28,
1926, Germany-Latvia. art. 1(6), 53 L.N.T.S. 417, 419-21, Treaty of Commerce and Nav-
igation, Mar. 24, 1928, Germany-Greece, art. 7, 90 L.N.T.S. 79, 8 I-83; Treaty of Commerce
and Navigation, Oct. 30, 1928. Germany-Lithuania, art. 5, 89 L.N.T.S. 149, 151-52;
Convention Regarding Conditions of Residence, Feb. 17, 1929, Germany-Persia, art. 9, 111
L.N.T.S. 258, 260; Convention Respecting Conditions of Residence, Aug. 29, 1931, Poland-
Turkey, art. 7, 144 L.N.T.S. 367, 373; Convention of Establishment, Apr. 25, 1934,
Switzerland-Persia, art. 9, 160 L.N.T.S. 173, 179-81 ; Treaty of Establishment, Commerce
and Navigation, Aug. 27, 1935, Iran-U.S.S.R., art. 3, 176 L.N.T.S. 299, 303; Convention
of Establishment, Aug. 27, 1930, France-Romania, art. 2, 158 L.N.T.S. 379, 383; Con-
vention Regarding Establishment and Navigation, Feb. 20, 1933, Belgium-Netherlands, art.
8, §§ 4-5, 165 L.N.T.S. 404, 407-08; Convention of Establishment and Labour, Apr. 1,
1933, Luxembourg-Netherlands, art. 8, §§ 3-4, 179 L.N.T.S. 31, 34-35; Convention Con-
cerning the Rights of Nationals and Commercial and Shipping Matters, May 12, 1933,
Canada-France, art. 3, 253 U.N.T.S. 285, 288; Treaty Concerning the Treatment of Na-
tionals, Companies, Co-operative Societies and Associations of the Other Country, May 7,
1935, Finland-Switzerland, art. 4, 166 L.N.T.S. 35, 39; Convention of Establishment, Nov.
5, 1937, Belgium-Siam, art. 5, §§ 4-5, 190 L.N.T.S. 163, 169.
147. Convention Respecting Conditions or Residence, July 23, 1923, Poland-Turkey,
art. 8, 49 L.N.T.S. 345, 351; Convention Respecting Conditions of Residence and Business,
July 24, 1923, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Romania, the Serb-Croat-Slovene
State-Turkey, art. 6, 28 L.N.T.S. 5i, 159; Convention Respecting Conditions of Residence,
Jan. 28, 1924, Austria-Turkey, art. 8, 32 L.N.T.S. 303, 309; Establishment Convention,
Feb. 29, 1924, Albania-Italy, art. 1, 44 L.N.T.S. 331, 335; Convention Respecting Con-
ditions of Residence, Oct. 18, 1925, Bulgaria-Turkey, art. 8, 54 L.N.T.S. 135, 141; Con-
vention of Commerce and Navigation, June 2, 1926, Finland-Turkey, art. 6, 70 L.N.T.S.
329, 333; Convention Regarding Conditions of Residence, Dec. 20, 1926, Hungary-Turkey,
art. 7, 72 L.N.T.S. 245, 249; Convention Concerning Conditions of Residence and Business,
Jan. 12, 1927, Germany-Turkey, art. 6, 73 L.N.T.S. 197, 199; Convention Respecting
Conditions of Residence and Business, Aug. 7, 1927, Switzerland-Turkey, art. 5, 73 L.N.T.S.
51, 55; Convention of Commerce and Navigation, Feb. 4, 1928, Sweden-Turkey, art. 6,
88 L.N.T.S. 155, 159; Convention of Commerce and Navigation, Mar. 12, 1928, Estonia-
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"reasonable' '148 or "proper' 149 compensation in the event of a taking
of foreign-owned property. In addition, a November 28, 1928 con-
vention between Egypt and Persia expressed that foreigners, "[like
nationals, may only be expropriated or deprived of their property...
on payment of compensation. "150
Similar to their United States counterparts during the inter-War
period, 5' these treaties provide little specific guidance as to an in-
ternational rule. However, several conclusions may be reached. First,
these treaties tend to establish an international norm that requires that
a minimum level of compensation be paid. Yet, if the ordinary
meaning approach toward treaty interpretation 152 is applied, the use
of words such as "fair" and "reasonable" compensation suggests
that full compensation is not required. Rather, the treaties would
seem to require an equitable balancing between the interests of the
taking state and the foreign national. Moreover, if the integration
approach 53 (i.e., various other provisions within the treaty are looked
at to give content to the provision in question) is used, it would be
reasonable to conclude that, subject to a requirement to provide some
fair amount of compensation, the taking state is to determine how
much remuneration is paid. All but three of the seventeen treaties
which call for "fair," "reasonable" or "proper" compensation also
contain provisions which state that foreigners shall be placed on the
same footing as nationals with respect to property protection. 54  The
Turkey, art. 6, 86 L.N.T.S. 453, 457; Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, Sept. 29, 1929,
Sweden-Turkey, art. 6, 119 L.N.T.S. 53, 57; Convention of Establishment, Dec. 13, 1930,
Switzerland-Turkey, art. 5, 129 L.N.T.S. 331, 335.
148. Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, Oct. 6, 1927, Germany-Kingdom of Serbs,
Croats and Slovenes, art. 4, 77 L.N.T.S. 48, 50, 51; Treaty of Commerce, Mar. 24, 1934,
Finland-Germany, art. 4, 149 L.N.T.S. 385, 387.
149. Convention Concerning Private Property, Rights and Interests, Feb. 6, 1922,
France-Poland, art. 4, 43 L.N.T.S. 399, 403.
150. Treaty of Friendship and Establishment, Nov. 28, 1928, Egypt-Persia, art. 5, 93
L.N.T.S. 395, 397.
151. See supra notes 99-107 and accompanying text for a discussion of inter-War
United States treaties.
152. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
154. Convention Concerning Private Property. Rights and Interests, Feb. 6. 1922,
France-Poland, art. 4, 43 L.N.T.S. 399, 403; Convention Respecting Conditions of Resi-
dence, July 23, 1923, Poland-Turkey, art. 9, 49 L.N.T.S. 345, 351; Convention Respecting
Conditions of Residence, Jan. 28, 1924, Austria-Turkey, art. 9, 32 L.N.T.S. 303, 309;
Establishment Convention, Feb. 29, 1924, Albania-Italy, art. I, 44 L.N.T.S. 331. 333;
Convention Respecting Conditions of Residence, Oct. 18, 1925, Bulgaria-Turkey, art. 9,
54 L.N.T.S. 135, 141, Convention of Commerce and Navigation, June 2, 1926, Finland-
Turkey, art. 7, 70 L.N.T.S. 329, 333; Convention Regarding Conditions of Residence, Dec.
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January 28, 1924 Convention Respecting Conditions of Residence
between Austria and Turkey 55 is representative. Article 9 of this
treaty states that "[n]ationals of each of the Contracting Parties shall
enjoy in the territory of the other Party the same treatment as nationals
of the country, as regards legal and judicial protection of their persons
and property."' 1
56
In only one treaty concluded during the period between the First
and Second World Wars was full compensation specified as the mea-
sure of damages. A 1923 treaty between the Soviet Union and
Denmark provided that" [f]unds, goods, movable or immovable prop-
erty, belonging to the nationals of the one country, lawfully imported
into or acquired in the other country, shall not be subjected therein
to requisition or any other compulsory appropriation on the part of
the Government or of any local authorities without full
compensation." ' 5
7
Two conclusions may be abstracted from this review of inter-
War, non-United States treaties. First, the treaties provide virtually
no support for the notion that full compensation was the traditional
standard for a taking of foreign-owned property. Second, the treaties
show that international custom merely required that foreigners be
treated the same as citizens of the taking state or the most-favored
nation. Virtually all European nations were signatories to treaties
with such provisions. 158  Middle East states such as Turkey, 5 9
Persia' 60 and Egypt16' also entered into this type of agreement. In the
20, 1926, Hungary-Turkey, art. 9, 72 L.N.T.S. 245, 249; Convention Concerning Conditions
of Residence and Business, Jan. 12, 1927, art. 2, 73 L.N.T.S. 197, 198; Convention
Respecting Conditions of Residence and Business, Aug. 7, 1927, Switzerland-Turkey, art.
6, 73 L.N.T.S. 51, 55; Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, Oct. 6, 1927, Germany-
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, art. 1, 77 L.N.T.S. 48, 49; Convention of Commerce
and Navigation, Feb. 4, 1928, Sweden-Turkey, art. 7, 88 L.N.T.S. 155, 160; Convention
of Commerce and Navigation, Mar. 12, 1928, Estonia-Turkey, art. 7, 86 L.N.T.S. 453,
457; Treaty of Friendship and Establishment, Nov. 28, 1928, Egypt-Persia, art. 6, 93
L.N.T.S. 395, 397; Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, Sept. 29, 1929, Sweden-Turkey,
art. 7, 119 L.N.T.S. 53, 58-59.
155. Convention Respecting Conditions of Residence, Jan. 28, 1924, Austria-Turkey,
32 L.N.T.S. 303.
156. Id. art. 9, 32 L.N.T.S. at 309.
157. Primary Agreement, Apr. 23, 1923, Denmark-U.S.S.R., art. 4(4), 18 L.N.T.S.
16, 20.
158. See supra notes 134-48 and authorities cited therein.
159. See supra notes 135-35, 140, 144, & 146.
160. See supra notes 134-35, 137-38, & 149.
161. See supra notes 134 & 149.
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Far East, Japan, 162  China 63  and Siam' 64 were countries which
agreed to national or most-favored nation provisions with respect to
expropriation. As has been illustrated in the previous section, pre-
World War II United States treaty practice also supports this princi-
ple. 165 Most of the present nations of Africa, of course, were not
independent before the Second World War and, therefore, incapable
of concluding a treaty. Finally, although almost no such treaties were
signed by Latin American nations, 66 their adherence to a rule of
national treatment is readily apparent. These countries' espousal of
the Calvo Doctrine, which states that aliens are entitled to the same
(but no greater) protection as nationals, 67 clearly illustrates their
acceptance of the custom evidenced by these treaties. Thus, the
world-wide adherence to national and most-favored nation treatment
with respect to expropriation demonstrates that it, and not full com-
pensation, was the generally accepted rule prior to the Second World
War. Indeed, one commentator writing in the inter-War period stated
that national treatment with respect to expropriation and requisition
of alien property represented the international practice of the
time. 68  As discussed above, 169 such practice grants the taking state,
subject to its internal laws respecting compensation to nationals, the
right to determine the indemnity paid to foreigners.
B. World War II to the Early 1960's
In the period following the Second World War until the early
1960's, most of the treaties supported the notion that the taking state
enjoys the right to determine the amount of compensation paid to
expropriated foreigners. However, as will be seen, there also began
to emerge support for the full compensation principle. The treaties
which support the argument that the measure of compensation is to
be determined by the taking state fall into two categories. At least
162. See supra note 146.
163. See supra note 140.
164. See supra notes 136, 140, & 142.
165. See supra notes 80-107 and accompanying text.
166. Guatemala did conclude a treaty with the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union
which specified national treatment in the event of a requisition. See supra note 140.
167. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
168. Cutler, supra note 139, at 232.
169. See supra text accompanying note 139.
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ten conventions directly supported such a rule. 70 The 1961 Treaty
of Amity and Commerce between Japan and Indonesia is illustrative:
Property of nationals and companies of either Party shall not be
taken within the territory of the other except for a public purpose,
nor shall it be taken without just compensation in accordance with
the laws and regulations of such other Party. In all matters dealt
with in this Article, nationals and companies shall receive, within
the territory of the other Party, treatment no less favorable than
that accorded to nationals and companies of any third country.'17
Likewise, a 1946 treaty between Denmark and the Republic of China
stated that the property of Danish citizens residing in China "shall
be subject to the laws and regulations of the Republic of China con-
cerning eminent domain .... '172
There also exists a group of treaties which indirectly support the
notion that international law allows the taking state to determine the
level of compensation to be paid to foreign property owners. These
treaties assert that the property of foreigners is subject to the laws of
the state where it is situated. 73  A 1952 convention between India
170. Treaty Concerning the Abolition of Extra-Territorial Rights in China, Oct. 20,
1943, Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union-Republic of China, art. 6, 14 U.N.T.S. 382,
387; Treaty for the Relinquishment of Extraterritorial Rights in China, May 20, 1946,
Denmark-Republic of China, art. 3, 12 U.N.T.S. 59, 63; Convention on Conditions of
Residence and Navigation. Feb. 16, 1954, Sweden-France, art. 8, 228 U.N.T.S. 137, 145;
Treaty of Establishment, Aug. 23, 1951, France-Italy, art. 4,291 U.N.T.S. 156, 157; Treaty
of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Dec. 23, 1957, Federal Republic of Germany-
Dominican Republic, art. 6(4), 1959 Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I [BGBI] 1468, cited in
FATOUROS, supra note 7, at 168-69 nn. 212-13; Agreement on Commerce, Apr. 22, 1960,
Cuba-Japan, art. 4, 442 U.N.T.S. 261, 279-80; Agreement on Commerce, May 15, 1961,
Japan-Peru, art. 4, 451 U.N.T.S. 3, 34; Treaty of Amity and Commerce, July 1, 1961,
Indonesia-Japan, art. 4, 517 U.N.T.S. 107, 127. 2 I.L.M. 706, 708-09; Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation, Dec. 20, 1961, Argentina-Japan, art. 5, 613 U.N.T.S. 323,
357-59; Commercial Treaty, July 19, 1963, El Salvador-Japan, art. 4, 518 U.N.T.S. 135,
161, 4 I.L.M. 477, 481.
171. Treaty of Amity and Commerce, July I, 1961, Indonesia-Japan, art. 4, 517
U.N.T.S. 107, 127, 2 I.L.M. 706, 708-09 (emphasis added).
172. Treaty Concerning the Relinquishment of Extraterritorial Rights in China, May
20, 1946, Denmark-Republic of China, art. 3, 12 U.N.T.S. 59, 63.
173. Treaty of Amity, Aug. 20, 1943, Republic of China-Brazil, art. 3, 14 U.N.T.S.
365, 370; Treaty of Amity, Aug. 1, 1944, Republic of China-Mexico, art. 6, 14 U.N.T.S.
441, 449; Treaty of Amity, Jan. 6, 1946, Republic of China-Ecuador, art. 5, 7 U.N.T.S.
233, 241; Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, Aug. 17, 1946, Denmark-U.S.S.R., art.
13, 8 U.N.T.S. 201, 224; Treaty of Friendship and General Relations, July 9, 1947, Italy-
Philippines, art. 4, 44 U.N.T.S. 3, 6; Treaty of Friendship, June 14, 1949, Thailand-
Philippines, art. 5, 81 U.N.T.S. 53, 56; Treaty of Friendship, Consular Service and Estab-
lishment, Aug. 28, 1950, Greece-Philippines, art. 5, 225 U.N.T.S. 155, 158; Treaty of
Friendship, July 11, 1952, India-Philippines, art. 5, 203 U.N.T.S. 73, 80; Treaty of Friend-
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and the Phillipines is emblematic. Article 5 of the agreement provides:
The nationals of each of the High Contracting Parties within the
territories of the Other shall be permitted to enjoy reciprocally the
right to acquire, possess and dispose of movable and immovable
property . . and to engate in trade, industry and other peaceful
and lawful pursuits, subject always to the constitution, laws and
regulations promulgated, or which may hereafter be promulgated
by the Other. 1
74
A small group of treaties concluded prior to the early 1960's
were more speculative in their terms. A treaty between Spain and
the Philippines called for "just compensation.' '1 75  Similarly, two
treaties, between India and Afghanistan 76 and India and Iran 177 de-
clared that "real and just compensation" would be provided in the
event that either party nationalized the property of citizens of the
other. Finally, a 1963 agreement between Great Britain and the
Cameroon stated that in the event of an expropriation, the taking state'
should, "in accordance with international law, make provision of the
payment of adequate and effective compensation."'178
Toward the end of this period, however, several treaties began
to call for full compensation. At least three agreements provided for
"prompt, adequate and effective compensation.' ' 79  Moreover, a
treaty signed in 1960 between Japan and Pakistan specified that com-
pensation representing the "full equivalent of the property taken"
ship, Aug. 30, 1956, Switzerland-Philippines, art. 5, 293 U.N.T.S. 43, 46; Treaty of Amity,
Nov. 19, 1957, Republic of China-Jordan, art. 4, 308 U.N.T.S. 227, 236; Treaty of Friend-
ship, Commerce and Navigation, Mar. 28, 1967, Israel-Haiti, art. 2, 630 U.N.T.S. 293,
295-97.
174. Treaty of Friendship, July 1I, 1952, India-Philippines, art. 5,203 U.N.T.S. 73,
80 (emphasis added).
175. Treaty on Civil Rights and Consular Prerogatives, May 20, 1948, Philippines-
Spain, art. 3, 70 U.N.T.S. 143, 146.
176. Treaty of Commerce, Apr. 4, 1950, Afghanistan-India, art. 3, 167 U.N.T.S. 112,
114.
177. Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, Dec. 15, 1954, India-Iran, art. 3, 327
U.N.T.S. 245, 262.
178. Agreement on Commercial and Economic Co-operation, July 29, 1963, Cameroon-
Great Britain, art. 5, 478 U.N.T.S. 149, 152, 2 I.L.M. 1030, 1031.
179. Treaty of Commerce, Establishment and Navigation, Mar. 11, 1959, Great Britain-
Iran, art. 15, reprinted in Lauterpacht, The Contemporary Practice of the United Kingdom
in the Field of International Law-Survey and Comment, 9 INr'L & CoNAP. L.Q. 253, 295
(1960); Agreement on Commerce, May 10, 1960, Japan-Malaya [Malaysia], art. 4. 383
U.N.T.S. 293, 298; Treaty of Commerce, Establishment and Navigation, Nov. 14, 1962,
Great Britain-Japan, art. 14, 478 U.N.T.S. 29, 100, 2 I.L.M. 151, 157-58.
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must be paid.180 Thus, while international treaty practice from the
Second World War to the early 1960's generally supported the right
of the nationalizing state to decide the level of compensation, the
period also witnessed some emergent movement toward a full com-
pensation standard.
C. The Early 1960's to the Present
Beginning in the early 1960's, and continuing to the present, a
dramatic reversal of previous international treaty practice took place.
Virtually all the treaties required either full compensation or a standard
which, albeit more vague, resembles the Hull Doctrine. In only a
few of the many agreements concluded in this period was full com-
pensation clearly not mandated.
In most of the treaties signed during the last two decades, at least
one of the parties was a Third World nation. Typically the other
signatory was an industrialized country. The treaties follow various
standard formats, depending on which Western state was the other
signatory. Therefore, these agreements will be analyzed accordingly.
1. The Federal Republic of Germany
Since the early 1960's the Federal Republic of Germany has
concluded by far the largest number of investment treaties. With only
three exceptions these treaties leave no doubt that full compensation
is mandated in the event of an expropriation. A 1962 treaty con-
cerning the Encouragement of Investments with the Cameroon illus-
trates the format of most West German conventions:
The investments of nationals or companies of either Contracting
Party in the territory of the other Contracting Party shall not be
expropriated except for the public benefit and against compen-
sation. Such compensation shall represent the equivalent of the
investment affected and shall be fixed and made without delay; it
shall be actually realizable and freely transferable. 181
This language, with occasional slight variations, was followed in over
forty other agreements. 8 2 Similarly, a December 22, 1960 agree-
180. Treaty of Friendship and Commerce, Dec. 18, 1960, Japan-Pakistan, art. 4(4),
423 U.N.T.S. 197, 200-02.
181. Treaty Concerning Encouragement of Investments, June 29, 1962, Federal Re-
public of Germany-Cameroon, art. 3(2), 1963 Bundesgestzblatt, Teil I [BGBI] 991, IN-
TERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES, 1962 INVESTMENT
PROMOTION AND PROTECTION TREATIES 41, 41 [hereinafter cited as INVESTMENT TREATIES].
182. See infra Appendix B for a list of these treaties and agreements.
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ment with Malaya [Malaysia] declared the standard to be "prompt,
adequate and effective compensation.' ' 8
3
In only three West German agreements was full compensation
not mandated. A 1961 treaty with Thailand called for "just com-
pensation." ' 84  In the protocol "just compensation" was defined as
"fair and equitable compensation to be assessed in conformity with
the principles of international law.' ' 18 5  A 1964 exchange of notes
establishing an investment guarantee by India declared:
The Government of India do [sic] not intend, as a rule to nation-
alize or expropriate approved foreign investments. . . . In the
event of a German investor being directly or indirectly deprived
of his investment by nationalization or expropriation the Govern-
ment of India shall pay fair and equitable compensation and shall
permit its effective transfer without undue delay. 86
Finally, an October 12, 1979 treaty with Romania called for "fair
compensation.' ' 87  It went on, however, to provide that "[t]he pro-
cedure for determination of the compensation shall conform to the
laws of the Contracting Party in whose territory the investment has
been made." 8 8
2. Switzerland
Switzerland is second with respect to the number of investment
treaties entered into since the early 1960's. The Swiss form, however,
is different from that of West Germany. Most Swiss treaties call for
either "an effective and adequate indemnity" 1 89 or for "an effective
183. Agreement Concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments,
Dec. 22, 1960, Federal Republic of Germany-Malaya [Malaysia], art. 4(1), 1962 BGBI
1064, 1960 INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 181, at 1, 2-3.
184. Treaty Concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Dec.
13, 1961, Federal Republic of Germany-Thailand, art. 3(2), 541 U.N.T.S. 192, 194.
185. Id. Protocol para. 3(b), 541 U.N.T.S. at 204.
186. Investment Guaranty Agreement, Oct. 15, 1964, Federal Republic of Germany-
India, para. l(d), 4 I.L.M. 491, 493.
187. Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments,
Oct. 12, 1979, Federal Republic of Germany-Romania, art. 3(1), 1980 BGBI 1157, 1979
INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 181, at 57, 58.
188. Id.
189. Treaty Concerning the Protection and Encouragement of Capital Investment, Dec.
2, 1961, Switzerland-Tunisia, art. 3, 3 I.L.M. 524, 524; Convention concernant l'encour-
agement et la protection r~ciproque des investissements, Apr. 7, 1971, Switzerland-Republic
of Korea, art. 4, 1971 Recueil officiel des lois et ordonnances de la Conffdfration suisse
[ROLF] 731, 1971 INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 181, at 1, 3; Agreement on the
Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Mar. 6, 1973, Switzerland-Singapore,
art. 4, 1973 INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 181, at 5, 7; Convention concernant l'en-
1983]
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and adequate indemnity conforming with international law." 90 Yet,
three treaties did provide that the indemnity shall represent the equiv-
alent of the investment expropriated. 191
3. The United Kingdom
In the middle 1970's the United Kingdom began to negotiate a
network of bilateral investment agreements. With only one exception,
all of these agreements require compensation equal to the market value
of the nationalized property. 192 The first of these treaties, the June
11, 1975 Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments
with Egypt, 193 set the basic format for its successors. It stated that
neither state would nationalize or expropriate the property of citizens
or companies of the other except "against prompt, adequate and
effective compensation. Such compensation shall amount to the mar-
ket value of the investment expropriated .... "194 The only agree-
ment not expressly requiring full compensation was signed on
November 28, 1979 with Thailand. 195 It stipulated that foreign na-
tionals would be entitled to "fair and equitable treatment" and "pay-
ment of compensation" in the event of a property tak-
couragement et la protection r6ciproques des investissements, July 25, 1973, Switzerland-
Egypt, art. 6, 1974 ROLF 1283, 1973 INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 181, at 35, 37;
Convention concernant l'encouragement et la protection r6ciproques des investissements,
Feb. 6, 1974, Switzerland-Indonesia, art. 6(1), 1976 ROLF 1954, 1974 INVESTMENT TREA-
TIES, supra note 181, at 1, 3; Convention concernant I'encouragement et la protection
r6ciproques des investissements, Feb. 17, 1974, Switzerland-Sudan, art. 6, 1975 ROLF 97,
1974 INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 181, at 7, 9; Convention concernant l'encouragement
et la protection r6ciproque des investissements, Mar. 1, 1978, Switzerland-Malaysia, art. 5,
1978 ROLF 1183, 1978 INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 181, at 7, 11.
190. See infra Appendix C.
191. Convention concernant l'encouragement et Ia protection r6ciproques de investisse-
ments, May 3, 1965, Switzerland-Tanzania, art. 3(4), 1965 ROLF 861, 1965 INVESTMENT
TREATIES, supra note 181, at 17, 18; Convention concemant l'encouragement et la protection
r6ciproque des investissements, Aug. 23, 1971, Switzerland-Uganda, art. 6(3), 1972 ROLF
2524, 1971 INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 181, at 37, 39; Agreement for the Reciprocal
Promotion and Protection of Investments, Sept. 23, 1981, Switzerland-Sri Lanka, art. 6, 21
I.L.M. 399, 402-03, 1981 INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 181, at 79, 82.
192. See infra Appendix D.
193. Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, June 11, 1975, United
Kingdom-Egypt, 1976 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 97 (Cmd. 6638), 14 I.L.M. 1470, 1975 INVEST-
MENT TREATIES, supra note 181, at 25.
194. Id. art. 5(1), 14 I.L.M. at 1471-72, 1975 INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 181,
at 27.
195. Agreement for the Promotion of the Investment of Capital and the Protection of
Investments, Nov. 28, 1979, United Kingdom-Thailand, 1979 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 99 (Cmd.
7478), 1978 INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 181, at 75.
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ing. 196 However, it went on to state that the "compensation shall
be adequate, shall be effectively realizable and made without delay
'' 197
4. France
Most French treaties also require the payment of full compen-
sation. The standard language in these treaties requires the taking
state to pay a just indemnity, the amount of which shall correspond
to the value of the expropriated investments. 198 In only three in-
stances was this format not followed. A 1975 agreement with
Malaysia required the prompt payment of an effective and transferable
indemnity.199 In addition, "just" and "just and equitable" indem-
196. Id. art. 6(l)(a), 1978 INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 181, at 77.
197. Id.
198. See Convention sur la protection des investissements, Oct. 5, 1972, France-Zaire,
art. 3, 1975 Journal Officiel de la R~publique Franqaise [J.O.] 9507, 1972 INVESTMENT
TREATIES, supra note 181, at 32, 33; Convention sur la protection des investissements, Mar.
22, 1973, France-Mauritius, art. 3, 1974 J.O. 5367, 1973 INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra
note 181, at 15, 16; Accord pour I'encouragement et la protection des investissements, June
14, 1973, France-Indonesia, art. 6(2), 1975 J.O. 7820, 1973 INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra
note 181, at 21, 24; Convention sur 1'encouragement et la protection r~ciproques des in-
vestissements, Dec. 22, 1974, France-Egypt, art. 4, 1975 J.O. 11,486, 1974 INVESTMENT
TREATIES, supra note 181, at 85, 87; Agreement Concerning the Promotion and Protection
of Investments, Sept. 8, 1975, France-Singapore, art. 4(1)-(2), 1975 INVESTMENT TREATIES,
supra note 181, at 49, 51; Accord sur 1'encouragement et la protection r~ciproques des
investissements, Aug. 11, 1976, France-Malta, art. 4, 1977 J.O. 6361, 1976 INVESTMENT
TREATIES, supra note 181, at 57, 59; Convention sur I'encouragement et la garantie r~cip-
roques des investissements, Dec. 16, 1976, France-Romania, art. 6(2), 1978 J.O. 3594,
1976 INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 181, at 92, 95; Convention sur 1'encouragement et
la protection rfciproques des investissements, Nov. 28, 1971, France-Syria, art. 5, 1980
J.O. 1418, 1977 INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 181, at 43, 45; Accord sur 1'encour-
agement et la protection des investissements, Dec. 23, 1977, France-Republic of Korea, art.
3(3), 1979 J.O. 834, 1977 INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 181, at 49, 51; Convention
sur I'encouragement et la protection rciproques des investissements, Feb. 23, 1978, France-
Jordan, 1979 J.0. 2758, 1978 INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 181, at 1, 3; Convention
sur I'encouragement et la protection rfciproques des investissements, July 31, 1978, France-
Sudan, art. 5, 1980 J.O. 2295, 1978 INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 181, at 33, 35;
Convention sur l'encouragement et la protection r~ciproques des investissements, Nov. 30,
1978, France-Paraguay, art. 5, 1981 J.0. 178, 1978 INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 181,
at 85, 87; Convention sur I'encouragement et la protection rdciproques des investissements,
Mar. 23, 1979, France-Liberia, art. 5, 1982 J.O. 689, 1979 INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra
note 181, at 8, 9; Convention sur I'encouragement et la protection r~ciproques des inves-
tissements, Sept. 20, 1978, France-El Salvador, art. 5, 1978 INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra
note 181, at 39, 40; Convention sur l'encouragement et la protection rciproques des in-
vestissements, Apr. 10, 1980, France-Sri Lanka, art. 7(2), 1982 J.O. 1950, 1980 INVESTMENT
TREATIES, supra note 181, at 41, 44.
199. Accord sur la garantie des investissements, Apr. 24, 1975, France-Malaysia, art.
3, 1977 J.O. 2136, 1975 INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 181, at 9, 11.
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Most Dutch treaties also follow the French form. That is, they
express that compensation, which shall represent the value of the
investments concerned, shall be paid if one nation expropriates the
property of nationals of the other. 20 2  Several Dutch agreements,
however, are more ambiguous in their expropriation provisions. One
calls for "just" compensation 20 3 while five others provide for either
"effective and adequate" or "just" compensation, in accordance with
international law. 204
200. Convention sur la protection des investissements, Mar. 28, 1974, France-
Yugoslavia, art. 5, 1975 J.0. 4813, 1974 INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 181, at 14,
15.
201. Accord sur la protection, l'encouragement et la garantie r6ciproques des inves-
tissements, July 15, 1975, France-Morocco, art. 5, 1977 J.0. 677, 1975 INVESTMENT TREA-
TIES, supra note 181, at 33, 34-35.
202. See Agreement on Economic Cooperation, June 7, 1968, Netherlands-Indonesia,
art. 7(c), 1968 Tractatenblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden [Trb.] No. 88, 1968
INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 181, at 13, 15; Agreement on Economic and Technical
Cooperation, Apr. 14, 1970, Netherlands-Tanzania, art. 9(c), 1970 Trb. No. 77, 1970
INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 18 1, at 7, 9; Agreement on Economic Cooperation, Apr.
24, 1970, Netherlands-Uganda, art. 9(c), 1970 Trb. No. 87, 1970 INVESTMENT TREATIES,
supra note 181, 13, 15; Agreement on Economic and Technical Co-operation, Aug. 22,
1970, Netherlands-Sudan, art. 11, 1970 Trb. No. 168, 1970 INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra
note 181, at 19, 21; Agreement on Economic Co-operation, June 15, 1971, Netherlands-
Malaysia, art. 10, 1971 Trb. No. 152, 1971 INVESTMENT TREATIES, surpa note 181, at 27,
30; Accord de cooperation economique, Dec. 23, 1971, Netherlands-Morocco, art. 11(c),
1972 Trb. No. 14, 1971, INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 181, at 45, 48; Agreement on
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Oct. 16, 1974, Netherlands-
Republic of Korea, art. 5(c), 1974 Trb. No. 220, 1974 INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note
181, at 57, 59; Agreement on the Protection of Investments, Feb. 16, 1976, Netherlands-
Yugoslavia, art. 4(c), 1976 Trb. No. 40, 1976 INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 181, at
1, 2; Agreement on the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investments, Oct. 30,
1976, Netherlands-Egypt, art. 5(c), 1977 Trb. No. 9, 1976 INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra
note 181, at 77, 78-79; Agreement on the Encouragement and Protection of Investments,
Aug. 3, 1979, Netherlands-Senegal, art. 4(2), 1979 INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 181,
at 35, 36.
203. Agreement on Economic Cooperation, May 16, 1972, Netherlands-Singapore, art.
9(c), 1972 Trb. No. 124, 1972 INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 181, at 11, 14.
204. Agreement for Encouragement of Capital Investments, May 23, 1963, Netherlands-
Tunisia, art. 3, 1963 Trb. No. 106, 523 U.N.T.S. 237, 241, 4 I.L.M. 159, 159, 1971
INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 181, at 9, 10; Agreement on Economic and Technical
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6. Sweden
Swedish treaty practice follows essentially two patterns. At least
three agreements25 concluded during the middle 1960's called for
"une indemnitg effective et adequate, conformgment au droit des
gens. "206 In at least five recent treaties "prompt, adequate and ef-
fective" compensation was specified as the standard. 20 7  Finally, a
1982 convention with the People's Republic of China declared that
compensation "which shall . . . place the investor in the same fi-
nancial position as that in which the investor would have been if the
expropriation or nationalization had not taken place," must be paid. 20 8
7. The Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union
Most of the investment agreements concluded by the Belgo-
Luxembourg Economic Union also stipulate that full compensation
must be paid in the event of a nationalization. This is accomplished
Co-operation, Apr. 26, 1965, Netherlands-Ivory Coast, art. 5, 1965 Trb. No. 173, 634
U.N.T.S. 81, 85, 1971 INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 181, at 55, 56; Agreement on
Economic and Technical Co-operation, July 6, 1965, Netherlands-Cameroon, art. 6, 1965
Trb. No. 208, 571 U.N.T.S. 63, 67, 1965 INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 181, at 55,
56; Agreement on Economic Co-operation, Sept. 11, 1970, Netherlands-Kenya, art. 9, 1970
Trb. No. 166, 1970 INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 181, at 25, 26; Agreement on
Economic Co-operation, June 6, 1972, Netherlands-Thailand, art. 9(c), 1972 Trb. No. 80,
1972 INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 181, at 21, 23.
205. Accord Commercial, Aug. 27, 1965, Sweden-Ivory Coast, art. 6, 1966 Sveriges
Overenskommelser med Frammande Makter [SO.] 31, 1965 INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra
note 181, at 71, 74; Accord de Commerce, Apr. 10, 1966, Sweden-Madagascar, art. 8,
1967 S. No. 33, 6 I.L.M. 48, 48, 1966 INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 181, at 7, 8;
Accord Commercial, Feb. 24, 1967, Sweden-Senegal, art. 12, 1968 S.O. No. 22, 1967
INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 181, at 7, 9.
206. An effective and adequate indemnity, in conformity with public international law.
207. Agreement on the Mutual Protection of Investments, July 15, 1978, Sweden-
Egypt, art. 3(l)(c), 1979 S. 1, 1978 INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 181, at 23, 24-
25; Agreement on the Mutual Protection of Investments, Nov. 10, 1978, Sweden-
Yugoslavia, art. 3(c), 1979 S.. 29, 1978 INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 181, at 47,
48; Agreement Concerning the Mutual Protection of Investments, Mar. 3, 1979, Sweden-
Malaysia, art. 3(c), 1979 S.O. 17, 1979 INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 181, at I, 3;
Agreement on the Mutual Protection of Investments, Mar. 12, 1981, Sweden-Pakistan, art.
4(1)(c), 1981 S.O. 8, 1981 INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 181, at 19, 20-21; Agreement
on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Apr. 30, 1982, Sweden-Sri Lanka, art.
6(1)(c), 1982 S.0. 16, 1982 INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 181, at 23, 25-26.
208. Agreement on the Mutual Protection of Investments, Mar. 9, 1982, Sweden-
People's Republic of China, art. 3(1), 21 I.L.M. 477, 477, 1982 INVESTMENT TREATIES,
supra note 181, at 17, 18.
390 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J. [Vol. 6:355
through provisions which either require "full "209 or "market value"21 0
compensation or compensation equal to the value of the expropriated
property. 211 Several of these treaties also contain "prompt, adequate
and effective compensation" clauses.2 12  Two earlier treaties which
the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union entered into specified the
more ambiguous standard of "effective and adequate compensation,




Recent Italian treaties also follow the same format as most of
the other European nations. A 1967 agreement with Malta is typical.
Article 4 states that "[i]nvestments by nationals and companies of
either Contracting Party ...may not be expropriated except in the
public interest and only against payment of indemnity equal to the




209. Agreement on the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Dec.
20, 1974, Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union-Republic of Korea, art. 5(1)(c). 1974 IN-
VESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 181, at 67, 70; Agreement on the Encouragement and
Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Feb. 28, 1977, Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union-
Egypt, art. 5(l)(c), 1977 INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 181, at 9. 11; Agreement on
the Promotion and Protection of Investments, May 22, 1981, Belgo-Luxembourg Economic
Union-Bangladesh, art. 4(1), 1981 INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 181, at 63. 66.
210. Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Nov. 17, 1978. Belgo-
Luxembourg Economic Union-Singapore, art. 4(2), 1978 INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note
181, at 53, 55-56; Agreement on the Promotion and Mutual Protection of Investments. Mar.
27, 1980, Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union-Cameroon, art. 4(3), 1980 INVESTMENT
TREATIES, supra note 181, at 12, 15.
211. Accord relatif A la promotion, la protection et la garantie r6ciproques des inves-
tissements, May 8, 1978, Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union-Romania, art. 3(1)(c), 1978
INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 181, at 17, 19; Accord relatif A l'encouragement et d la
protection r~ciproques des investissements, Nov. 22, 1979. Belgo-Luxembourg Economic
Union-Malaysia, art. 4(1), 1979 INVESTMENT TREATIES. supra note 181. at 71, 74.
212. Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Nov. 17, 1978, Belgo-
Luxembourg Economic Union-Singapore, art. 4(1), 1978 INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note
181, at 53, 55-56; Accord relatif A l'encouragement et A la protection reciproques des
investissements, Nov. 22, 1979, Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union-Malaysia, art. 4(1),
1979 INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 181, at 71, 74; Agreement for the Promotion and
Protection of Investments, May 22, 1981, Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union-Bangladesh,
art. 4(1), 1981 INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 181, at 63, 66.
213. Convention Concerning the Encouragement of Capital Investment and the Pro-
tection of Property, July 15, 1964, Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union-Tunisia, art. 3, 561
U.N.T.S. 297, 301, 5 I.L.M. 1132, 1132; Convention Concerning the Encouragement of
Capital Investment and the Protection of Property, Apr. 28, 1965, Belgo-Luxembourg Eco-
nomic Union-Morocco, art. 4, 620 U.N.T.S. 171, 175.
214. Agreement Concerning Economic Cooperation and Investment Protection, July
28, 1967, Italy-Malta, art. 4, 1967 INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 181, at 44, 45. See
also Accord pour proteger et favoriser les investissements de capitaux, Nov. 18, 1968, Italy-
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9. Romania
Socialist Romania has also concluded a number of investment
agreements. Surprisingly, all but one of these agreements require full
compensation. Nine treaties require the payment of an indemnity
which shall be equal to the value of the expropriated prop-
erty.2 15  Similarly, a 1976 convention with Austria mandates full
compensation ("un plein dedommagement"). 216  Only a 1979 treaty
with West Germany allows the taking state to determine the amount
of remuneration. 217
10. Miscellaneous Treaties
Most of the remaining treaties also require full compensation in
the event that one of signatory nations expropriates property owned
by citizens of the other. The majority of these remaining treaties
state that the compensation shall be equal to to value of of nationalized
Gabon, art. 4, 1968 INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 181, at 29, 30; Accord en vue de
proteger et de favoriser les investissements de capitaux, June 1I, 1969, Italy-Chad, art. 4,
1969 INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 18 1, at 27, 28-29; Accord pour proteger et favoriser
les investissements de capitaux, July 23, 1969, Italy-Ivory Coast, art. 4(2), 1969 INVESTMENT
TREATIES, supra note 181, at 32, 33; Agreement Concerning the Encouragement and Re-
ciprocal Protection of Investments, Apr. 29, 1975, Italy-Egypt, art. 3(2), 1975 INVESTMENT
TREATIES, supra note 181, at 13, 13-14.
215. Agreement on the Mutual Protection of Investments of Capital, Mar. 19, 1976,
Romania-United Kingdom, art. 4(1), 1977 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 15 (Cmd. 6722), 1976 IN-
VESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 181, at 17, 19; Agreement on the Promotion and Mutual
Guarantee of Capital Investments, May 10, 1976, Romania-Egypt, art. 3(1), 1976 INVEST-
MENT TREATIES. supra note 181, at 37, 37-38; Convention sur l'encouragement, la protection
et la garantie r6ciproques des investissements, Dec. 16, 1976, Romania-France, art. 6(2),
1978 J.O. 3594, 1976 INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 181, at 92, 95; Accord relatif A
la promotion, la protection et la garantie r6ciproques des investissements, May 8, 1978,
Romania-Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union, art. 3(1)(c), 1978 INVESTMENT TREATIES,
supra note 181, at 17, 19; Accord sur l'encouragement, la promotion et la garantie des
investissements, Apr. 11, 1979, Romania-Gabon, art. 5(1)(c), 1979 INVESTMENT TREATIES,
supra note 181, at 15, 18; Agreement Concerning Reciprocal Capital Investment Promotion
and Guarantees, June 19, 1980, Romania-Senegal, art. 4(l)(c), 1980 INVESTMENT TREATIES,
supra note 181, at 81, 84; Agreement on the Reciprocal Guarantee of Investments, Aug.
30, 1980, Romania-Cameroon, art. 4(c), 1980 INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 181, at
90, 92; Agreement on the Mutual Promotion and Guarantee of Investments, Nov. 12, 1980,
Romania-Denmark, art. 4(i), 1980 INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 181, at 105, 108;
Agreement on the Mutual Promotion and Guarantee of Investments, Feb. 9, 1981, Romania-
Sri Lanka, art. 6(1), 1981 INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 181, at 1, 4.
216. Traitd pour la promotion, la garantie et la protection r6ciproques des investisse-
ments, Sept. 30, 1976, Romania-Austria, art. 4(1), 1976 INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note
181, at 65, 67.
217. See supra notes 187-88 and accompanying text.
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investment.2 18  In addition, a 1981 treaty between Austria and Bul-
garia mandates "full" compensation 219 and a 1980 agreement between
Finland and Egypt provides for "prompt, adequate and effective"
compensation. 220  Three conventions merely call for "effective and
adequate compensation." ' 22' Finally, a 1977 investment agreement
between Egypt and Yugoslavia allows the taking state to determine
the amount of compensation.
222
218. Agreement on Economic Co-operation, Oct. 25, 1964, Iraq-Kuwait, Protocol on
the Promotion of the Movement of Capital and Investments, art. 4, 1964 INVESTMENT
TREATIES, supra note 181, at 67, 68-69 (compensation equal to the value of the investment);
Agreement Concerning the Encouragement and the Reciprocal Protection of Investments,
Jan. 30, 1968, Denmark-Indonesia, art. 4(3), 720 U.N.T.S. 223, 226, 1968 INVESTMENT
TREATIES, supra note 181, at 1, 2 (compensation equal to the commercial value of the
investment); Agreement Concerning the Encouragement and the Reciprocal Protection of
Investments, Nov. 24, 1969, Indonesia-Norway, art. 4(3), 1969 INVESTMENT TREATIES,
supra note 181, at 39, 40 (compensation equal to the commercial value of the investments);
Agreement on the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Jan. 15, 1970,
Belgium-Indonesia, art. 5(c), 1970 INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 181, at 1, 3 (com-
pensation equal to the actual value of the property); Protocole relatif l'encouragement
r6ciproque des investissements, Mar. 28, 1976, Belguim-Zaire, art. 3, 1976 INVESTMENT
TREATIES, supra note 181, at 25, 26 (an indemnity corresponding to the value of the ex-
propriated property); Agreement Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection
of Investments, Jan. 28, 1977, Egypt-Japan, art. 5(3), 18 I.L.M. 44, 45, 1977 INVESTMENT
TREATIES, supra note 181, at 1, 2 (compensation representing the equivalent of the normal
market value of the investment); Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments,
Mar. 28, 1980, Republic of Korea-Sri Lanka, art. 7(1), 1980 INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra
note 181, at 33, 37 (prompt, adequate and effective compensation amounting to the market
value of the investment): Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, May
9, 1980, Singapore-Sri Lanka, art. 6(l)-(2), 1980 INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 181,
at 63, 66 (adequate, effective and prompt compensation equal to the market value of the
property); Agreement Concerning the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Mar. 1,
1982, Japan-Sri Lanka, art. 5(2)-(3), 1982 INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 181, at 7, 10
(prompt, adequate and effective compensation equal to the market value of the investment).
219. Treaty Relating to Mutual Cooperation and Investment Protection, May 15, 1981,
Austria-Bulgaria, art. 4(2), 1981 INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 181, at 45, 47-48.
220. Agreement on Mutual Protection of Investments, May 5, 1980, Egypt-Finland,
art. 3(l)(c), 1980 INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 181, at 49, 50-51.
221. Trade Agreement, Dec. 10, 1965, Denmark-Madagascar, art. 6, 735 U.N.T.S.
105, 111, 1965 INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 181, at 109, 111-12; Trade Agreement,
Nov. 23, 1966, Denmark-Ivory Coast, art. 7, 735 U.N.T.S. 119, 125, 1966 INVESTMENT
TREATIES, supra note 181, at 21, 23; Agreement Concerning the Encouragement and Re-
ciprocal Protection of Investments, Apr. 1, 1975, art. 6, 1975 INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra
note 181, at 1, 2.
222. "The measure with which the right[s] of nationals . . .of the other Contracting
Party [i.e., nationals of the non-taking state] [are] deprived or restricted simultaneously
determine[s] and pay[s] off the compensation." Agreement on Protection of Investments,
June 3, 1977, Egypt-Yugoslavia, art. 4, 1977 INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 181, at
15, 16.
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D. The Impact of Recent Treaties on International Law
Over seventy percent of the investment treaties and agreements
concluded since the early 1960's provide for full compensa-
tion. 23  With only two exceptions, 224 the remaining conventions
specify a standard that is somewhat ambiguous. These treaties either
call for the degree of compensation required by international law or
declare that just or adequate compensation must be ten-
dered. 2 5  Thus, it would appear that recent treaty practice provides
strong support for the position that customary international law re-
quires full compensation when an alien's property is nationalized.
While this indeed may now be the rule, there are at least two coun-
tervailing arguments.
First, as shown above, 226 treaties prior to the 1960's evidence
an international custom which allowed the taking state to determine
the amount of compensation. As long as the taking treated foreingers
the same as its own nationals and provided them with some compen-
sation, no violation of international law would occur. It is with this
previous custom in mind that the treaties of the past two decades must
be analyzed. In order to alter a prior customary norm, these recent
agreements must be universally subscribed to.227  Although most na-
tions in Europe, Africa, the Middle East, South Asia and East Asia
concluded treaties which established a duty to pay full compensation,
the assent of Latin American nations, not to mention most socialist
countries, to such a principle is conspicuously absent. Only seven
Latin American countries have entered into recent treaties with
European nations which mandate full compensation. 2 8  While it has
223. See supra notes 181-83, 191-94, 198, 202. 207-12, 214-16, 218-20 and accom-
panying text. In total, 126 of the 173 treaties reviewed above provided, in one form or
another, for full remuneration.
224. See supra notes 187-88, 217, 222 and accompanying text. Only two treaties, one
between West Germany and Romania and the other between Egypt and Yugoslavia. allowed
the taking state to determine the amount of compensation.
225. See supra notes 184-86, 189-90, 195-97, 199-201, 203-06, 213, 221 and accom-
panying text.
226. See supra notes 135-80 and accompanying text.
227. "'Common consent' can therefore only mean the express or tacit consent of such
an overwhelming majority of the members [of the international communityl that those who
dissent are of no importance as compared with the community viewed as an entity in
contradistinction to the wills of its single members." I OPPENHEIM, supra note 10, §, at
17.
228. These nations were the Caribbean nation of Haiti (with West Germany), see infra
Appendix B; the Central American states of Costa Rica (with the U.K.), see infra Appendix
D; Belize (with the U.K.), see infra Appendix D; and El Salvador (with France). see supra
note 198; and the South American countries of Ecuador (with West Germany), see infra
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
been asserted that "[s]ilence may . . . denote tacit agreement" with
respect to an international practice,2 29 in this case such logic does
not follow. Most Latin American states not only reject the full com-
pensation principle but also maintain that foreigners are entitled to
no greater protection than that accorded to nationals.2 30  Although
unanimous consensus is not required to establish a rule of customary
law, substantial uniformity is.231 Accordingly, a significant bloc of
nations, even if not a majority, can prevent the creation of a
norm.23 2  The continued rejection of a full compensation principle
by socialist and Latin American states has therefore impeded its es-
tablishment as a universally binding rule of customary international
law.
Consequently, what remains is either (1) the continuation of the
previous custom of national treatment 23 3 or (2) the existence of two
equally valid expropriation rules. However, the effect of both of
these possibilities is the same: the taking state may decide how much
compensation to grant expropriated aliens. If the second alternative
is the current standard, then a nation's compliance with either the
national treatment or the full compensation position would mean that
no international wrong has been committed. Thus, the ability to
decide which standard to abide by, provided that no specific treaty is
in force, allows a nation to indirectly determine the amount of in-
demnification it will pay foreigners.
Finally, it is noteworthy that, while most European nations insist
that full compensation is the international rule, many of their consti-
tutions do not require them to provide their own nationals with full
compensation. For example, the Austrian Supreme Court, in a de-
cision of November 22, 1961, declared that "[a]ccording to the con-
stant jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court ...compensation is
Appendix B; Colombia (with West Germany), see infra Appendix B; and Paraguay (with
the U.K. and with France), see infra Appendix D and supra note 198.
229. BROWNLIE, supra note 34, at 7.
230. See supra notes 22-23, 167 and accompanying text.
231. BROWNLIE, supra note 34, at 6.
232. Id. See also I OPPENHEIM, supra note 10, § 11, at 17 (an overwhelming majority
of nations is required), Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 114, 131 (Judgment of
Dec. 18); Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. v. Libya, 53 I.L.R. 389, 489-92, 17 I.L.M. 1,
28-30 (1978).
233. See Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co, 53 I.L.R. at 491-92, 17 I.L.M. at 30 (in-
sufficient support for a new principle of international law leaves the previous principle intact).
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not guaranteed by constitutional law."
234
The constitution (Basic Law) of the Federal Republic of Germany
specifically declares that "compensation shall be determined by an
equitable balance between the public interest and the interests of those
affected." 235 This provision "has not been interpreted in such a way
as to entitle the authorities to make substantial subtractions from the
amount of compensation to be paid to the land owner ' ' 236 and the
amount of compensation actually paid has often come close to the
market value.237  However, various commentators have noted that
the balancing of interests criterion "may lead to a different result in
individual cases: in one case it may produce a mere token compen-
sation, in others a just or even full and complete compensation." 2 38
Although the Italian constitution demands compensation upon a
property taking,23 9 the amount need not be full. In a decision of May
25, 1957 the Italian Constitutional Court (Corte costituzionale) held
that the amount of compensation must be determined by a balancing
of the public and private interests. 240  The Court further held that as
long as the remuneration is not merely symbolic, the legislature may
determine the precise amount. 241  The reason for this is that a co-
ordination of the public and private interests requires "a complex and
varied examination of economic, financial and political elements that
only a legislator can discharge." 2 2  However, in a decision of June
8, 1965, the high constitutional court qualified this legislative dis-
234. Austrian State Treaty (Individual Claim to Compensation) Case, Nov. 22, 1961,
Supreme Court, Austria, 40 I.L.R. 184, 186. Accord Seidl-Hohenveldern, Austria in IN-
DIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND THE STATE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 26, 32 (E. Lauterpacht & J.G. Collier
eds. 1977) ("All that Austrian law requires as a protection against expropriation is that
property may only be taken by virtue of a law. The payment of any compensation is not
required").
235. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 14 (W. Ger.), translated in 6 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
COUNTRIES OFTHE WORLD (A.P. Blaustein & G.H. Flanz eds.) [hereinafter cited as Blaustein
& FlanzJ.
236. Kimminich, Compensation for Expropriation of Land and for "Worsenment" in
the Federal Republic of Germany in COMPENSATION FOR COMPULSORY PURCHASE: A COM-
PARATIVE STUDY 190, 206 (J.F. Garner ed. 1975).
237. Id.
238. Schubert, Compensation Under New German Legislation on Expropriation, 9 AM.
J. COMP. L. 84, 87 (1960).
239. COSTITUZIONE [COST.] art. 42 (Italy), translated in 8 Blaustein & Flanz, supra
note 235.
240. Judgment Number 61, May 25, 1957, Corte costituzionale [Corte cost.], cited in
Tesauro, Compensation for Expropriation in Italy, in COMPENSATION FOR COMPULSORY
PURCHASE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 211, 218 (J.F. Garner ed. 1975).
241. Id.
242. Id.
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cretion. There the Court held that "compensation, in whatever mode
it is shaped, must always represent a serious reparation of an economic
inconvenience resulting from expropriation. '2 43  Thus, while the
Italian Constitution does not compel full market value, the amount
of compensation must bear a reasonable relation to the loss sustained
by the previous owner.
2 44
Swedish constitutional law affords only a weak protection of
property. Chapter 8, article 1, paragraph 4 of the Instrument of
Government declares:
Any private subject shall be guaranteed the right to obtain com-
pensation, according to principles to be determined by law, in
case his property is requisitioned by way of expropriation or other
such means of disposition.145
Thus, while this provision calls for compensation, it has been noted
that it "amount[s] only to a declaration in principle that the [right]
in question shall exist, but the details are left entirely to the legislator
'246
Because there is no written constitution in Great Britain, the
Parliament is a sovereign body.2 47  It therefore enjoys the power to
determine how much, if any, compensation to provide to an expro-
priated owner.2 48  Although market value is typically paid in the
United Kingdom, 249 the fact remains that it is not constitutionally
guaranteed.
French jurisprudence concerning the level of compensation con-
stitutionally due upon a property taking is still rather unsettled. In
1981 and 1982, following the election of Franqois Mitterand to the
Presidency and the capture of the National Assembly by a Socialist
243. Judgment Number 91, June 8, 1965, Corte cost., quoted in Tesauro, supra note
240, at 218.
244. See Tesauro, supra note 240, at 218.
245. REGERINGSFORMEN [RF] (Instrument of Government) ch. 8, art. 8, 4 (Swed.),
translated in 15 Blaustein & Flanz, supra note 235 (emphasis added).
246. Nyman, The New Swedish Constitution, 26 SCANDINAVIAN STUD. L. 171, 193
(1982).
247. See, e.g., Nathan, English Law and the Nationalized Industries, 5 REC. A.B.
CITY N.Y. 219, 222-23 (1950).
248. Mann, Outlines of a History of Expropriation, 75 LAW Q. REV. 188, 199 (1950).
The courts, however, have adopted a principle of construction in which they will not impute
an intent to withhold compensation absent an unequivocal statement in the expropriatory
legislation. Id. at 199.
249. Acquisition of Land (Assessment of Compensation) Act. 1919, 9 & 10 Geo. 5,
ch. 57, § 2(ii).
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majority, France implemented wide scale nationalizations. 20  The
first measure, however, was declared unconstitutional by the Conseil
Constitutionel (Constitutional Council) for, inter alia, failing to pro-
vide adequate indemnification.2 51 Immediately after this setback the
government went to work on reforming the bill. A new decree, which
substantially increased the amount of compensation, was very quickly
enacted.2 52  This revised measure was subsequently approved by the
Conseil.2
53
Nevertheless, it has been argued that "[e]ven though the com-
pensation received by shareholders under [the revised] system gen-
erally is greater than under the previous system, the compensation
still remains below, and in certain cases far below, the compensation
which might have been awarded had the shares been evaluated in
accordance with widely recognized international accounting prac-
tices. ' '2 54  This argument is apparently based on the fact that the
nationalizations were accomplished indirectly, that is, though forced
purchase of the target companies' stock, rather than directly. 25   Had
the companies been taken over directly, the normal system of valuation
would have been the so-called "going concern" approach, which
takes future profits into account. It is normally accomplished by
capitalization of profits from past years. 256  Therefore, although the
1982 revised version of the nationalization act provided for an in-
demnity substantially related to the value of the companies, it cannot
be said that full compensation was granted.
Several European nations, however, do constitutionally require
full compensation when the government expropriates property of na-
tionals. The constitutions of Denmark, 257 Finland,2 58 Norway, 25 9 and
250. See Borde & Eggleston, The French Nationalizations, 68 A.B.A. J. 422, 424
(1982). For two very good in-depth reviews of these nationalizations, see Loyrette & Gaillot,
The French Nationalizations: The Decisions of the French Constitutional Council and their
Aftermath, 17 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 17 (1982) and Note, Constitutional
Law: French Nationalizations, 23 HARV. INT'L L.J. 381 (1983).
251. Loyrette & Gaillot, supra note 250, at 53-54; Borde & Eggleston, supra note
250, at 426; Note, supra note 250, at 385.
252. The total amount of compensation to be paid was raised from $6 billion to ap-
proximately $7.4 billion, an increase of 23%. See Borde & Eggleston, supra note 250, at
426.
253. Loyrette & Gaillot, supra note 250, at 57-58.
254. Id. at 55 (footnotes omitted).
255. Cf. id. at 46, 51.
256. Capitalization essentially predicts future earnings on the basis of past profits.
257. Article 73 of the Danish Constitution Act provides:
(1) The right of property shall be inviolable. No person shall be ordered to cede
his property except where required by the public weal. It can be done only as
provided by statute and against full compensation.
CONST. AcT art. 73, I (Den.), translated in 5 Blaustein & Flanz, supra note 235.
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Switzerland2 60 expressly mandate a full indemnity. In addition, al-
though the Belgian26 1 and Dutch 262 constitutions do not specifically
require full compensation, they have been so interpreted.
This digression into the domestic law of various European states
is relevant for two reasons. First, because many European countries,
and indeed the most important ones, do not constitutionally guarantee
their own citizens full compensation, they are arguably estopped from
asserting that international law requires such a standard. 263 Second,
municipal laws can also be a source of international-law. In addition
to being evidence of custom, 264 the Statute of the International Court
of Justice states that "general principles of law" may be used as a
basis of decision. 265 Thus, the fact that many European nations do
not guarantee full compensation to their own nationals may have
influenced international law on the subject.
On the balance, therefore, it would appear that although most
258. "Expropriation of property for the general need with full compensation shall be
regulated by law." CONST. ACT art. VI, 4 (Fin.), translated in 6 Blaustein & Flanz,
supra note 235.
259. "If the welfare of the State requires that any person surrender his movable or
immovable property for the public use, he shall receive full compensation from the public
treasury." GRUNNLOV [Constitution] § 105 (Nor.), translated in 11 Blaustein & Flanz,
supra note 235.
260. "[T~he Confederation may, against full compensation, make use of the right of
expropriation." BUNDESVERFASSUNG [B. VERF.], CONSTITUTION FEDERALE [CONST.], CON-
STITUZIONE FEDERALE [CosT. FED.] art. 23(2) (Switz.), translated in 15 Blaustein & Flanz,
supra note 235.
261. The Belgian constitution call for "just compensation." CONSTITUTION [CONST.]
art. I I (Beig.), translated in 2 Blaustein & Flanz, supra note 235. This article dates back
to the original Constitution of 1831. Thus, the intent of the original framers, who considered
property an absolute and inviolable right, is important. Based on this theory, the state may
only alter the form of ownership through an expropriation; however, "the overall fortune
of the owner [must remain] unchanged in terms of value." THE BELGIAN CONSTITUTION,
COMMENTARY at 29 (1974) commentary by R. Senelle. Therefore, the owner must be paid
the full market value of the expropriated property. Id.
262. The Dutch constitution only calls for "compensation." See GRONDWET [GRW.
NED.] art. 165, (Neth.), translated in II Blaustein & Flanz, supra note 235. Yet, it has
been interpreted to require full indemnification. See Bergamin & van Maarseveen, Consti-
tutional and Administrative Law in INTRODUCTION TO DUTCH LAW FOR FOREIGN LAWYERS
381, 402 (1978).
263. It seems relatively clear that estoppel has been accepted as a general principle of
international law. See BROWNLIE, supra note 34, at 18, 164-65, 637-38. See also Case
Concerning the Arbitral Award Made by the King of Spain on 23 December 1906 (Hond.
v. Nicar.), 1960 I.C.J. 191, 209, 213 (Judgment of Nov. 18); Case Concerning the Temple
of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), 1962 I.C.J. 6, 23, 32 (Judgment of June 15).
264. See BROWNLIE, supra note 34, at 5.
265. I.C.J. STATUTE art. 38(1)(c).
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of the treaties concluded since the early 1960's require full compen-
sation, they have not established an international full compensation
rule. A combination of the previous treaty practice which allowed
the taking state to determine the amount of indemnification, the refusal
of socialist and Latin American nations to accede to a full compen-
sation standard, United Nations General Assembly resolutions and
the constitutional provisions of many European states has prevented
the Hull Doctrine from becoming an international legal principle.
VI. CASES AND ARBITRATIONS
Both international tribunals and municipal courts sitting in an
international capacity universally state that international law compels
the payment of compensation upon nationalization of an alien's prop-
erty. What is much less clear, however, is how much compensation
is required.
A. International Tribunals
In the Chorz6w Factory case266 the Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice enunciated what was thereafter generally accepted as
the requisite degree of compensation. The Court held that compen-
sation required "[r]estitution in kind, or, if this is not possible, pay-
ment of a sum corresponding to the value which a restitution in kind
would bear . . ",267 This definition refers to fair market value.
An examination of the facts of the case, however, reveals a rather
interesting complication. In Chorz6w Factory, Poland violated an
explicit provision of the Geneva Convention in which it had agreed
not to nationalize the property of German nationals in Upper
Silesia. 268  Thus, the case did not concern the amount of indemnity
due from an expropriation, but rather the remedies available for an
expropriation in violation of a specific agreement. Indeed, at least
two different tribunals have suggested that the Chorz6w Factory case
266. The Chorz6w Factory Case (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J., ser. A., No. 13 (Judg-
ment of Sept. 13).
267. Id. at 47.
268. The Court stated that the expropriation was "a seizure of property rights and
interests which could not be expropriated even against compensation, save under the ex-
ceptional conditions fixed by Article 7 of the said Convention." Id. at 46. The Court did
assert that if there had been no such treaty provision the measure of compensation would
have been "limited to the value of the undertaking at the moment of dispossession, plus
interest to the day of payment." Id. at 47. These remarks, however, are dictum. Morevoer,
the Court failed to cite authority or otherwise reveal the derivation of this "standard."
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should be limited to its facts. 269
In the Norwegian Shipowners' Claims,270 a case in which the
United States had requisitioned Norwegian ships being built in the
United States during the First World War, the Permanent Court of
Arbitration declared that "[j]ust compensation implies a complete
restitution of the status quo ante, based, not upon future gains of the
United States or other powers, but upon the loss of profits of the
Norwegian owners . ... ",2, The similarity between this statement
and the current approach of the United States government toward
compensation should be noted.2 72  However, in the Norwegian
Shipowners' case the court was unclear as to whether it based its
award of compensation on international law or American constitu-
tional law. 27
3
In the De Sabla Claim,2 74 the land of the claimant, an American
citizen, had been ceded to others by the Panamanian government.
On reaching the merits, the arbitral tribunal held that "[i]t is axiomatic
that acts of a government in depriving an alien of his property without
compensation imposes international responsibility." 275  The court held
that the fair market value of the property taken was the proper measure
of damages. 2
76
However, in Standard Oil Company Tankers277 the international
arbitral tribunal did not require full compensation. The German gov-
269. British Petroleum Exploration Co. v. Libya, 53 I.L.R. 297, 339-40 (1974) (Lag-
ergren, Arb.); Czechoslovak Agrarian Reform (Swiss Subjects) Case, Apr. 8, 1927, Sup.
Ct. of Justice, Czech., 4 Ann. Dig. 147, 149-50.
270. Norwegian Shipowners' Claims (U.S. v. Nor.), I R. Int'l Arb. Awards 307 (Perm.
Ct. Arb. 1921).
271. Id. at 338.
272. The United States regards the "going concern" approach, which attempts to
measure loss of future profits, as the best approximation of market value and hence, just
compensation. See Smith, supra note 9, at 519.
273. "In order to justify the Tribunal's opinion, it seems not necessary ...to touch
upon the question of whether consequential damages ought to be awarded in international
law. . . . It is common ground that . . . the Norwegian owners of these contracts were
protected by the fifth amendment of the Constitution of the United States against any ex-
propriation . . . and that they are entitled to just compensation if expropriation occurs." I
R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 334.
274. De Sabla Claim (U.S. v. Pan.), 6 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 358, 359 (1933), reprinted
in 28 AM. J. INT'L L. 602 (1934).
275. Id. at 366, 28 AM. J. INT'L L. at 611.
276. "[T]he Commission holds that the proper measure of damages arising from ad-
judications is ...to award to the claimant the full value of the number of hectares of her
property which have been adjudicated." Id. at 367, 28 AM. J. INT'L L. at 612.
277. Standard Oil Co. Tankers case (Reparations Comm'n v. U.S.), 3 Ann. Dig. 231,
463, 22 AM. J. INT'L L. 404 (1928).
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ernment, as part of the reparations following the Great War, had
awarded the victorious powers all German merchant ships over a
certain weight. Yet some of the vessels had belonged to a German
company in which the Standard Oil Company had an interest. 278  The
court rejected Standard's claim for full compensation on the grounds
that it had received the same treatment as German nationals. 27 9  The
tribunal further noted that it is a generally accepted principle that "any
person .. . investing capital in a foreign country must assume the
concomitant risks and must submit, under reservation of any measures
of discrimination against him as a foreigner, to all the laws of that
country .... "1280
Thus, the international tribunals that have considered the issue
of expropriation have tended to declare that the full value of the
nationalized property is the proper amount of remuneration. How-
ever, as the Standard Oil Company Tankers arbitration illustrates, full
compensation has not been universally accepted as an international
minimum standard by international courts. Moreover, the decisions
that granted full compensation are subject to criticism. These cases
merely assert that the fair market value of the property must be tend-
ered, yet, fail to declare the basis for this "require-
ment." 28' Whereas, in Standard Oil Company Tankers the principle
that foreign investors must submit to the laws of the host country was
significant in the arbitration's outcome. 282  Indeed, this logic is sup-
ported by the treaty law of that era. 283
B. Municipal Courts
Although the decisions of international tribunals regarding the
measure of compensation are inconclusive, the situation is quite dif-
ferent when the focus shifts to national courts. These courts have
generally recognized an international obligation on the expropriating
nation to pay compensation, but have been reluctant to declare that
full compensation must be rendered. Most instances in which mu-
278. Id. at 463-64, 22 AM. J. INTL L. at 405.
279. Id. at 231, 22 AM. J. INT'L L. at 419.
280. Id. at 231-32, 22 AM. J. INT'L L. at 419. The tribunal also held that Standard's
ownership of the German corporation did not mean that it owned the tankers. Thus, as a
shareholder Standard was only entitled to a percentage of the German company's assets upon
wind up and not to any compensation for the seized tankers. See 3 Ann. Dig. at 464, 22
AM. J. INT'L L. at 405-16.
281. See, e.g., supra notes 268 & 276.
282. See supra text accompanying notes 279-80.
283. See supra text accompanying notes 91-107, 135-74, 187-88, 217, 222.
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nicipal courts have reviewed the propriety of foreign nationalizations
have involved situations in which the goods were exported by the
taking state to the country of the municipal court whereupon the
injured party sought their recovery. Accordingly, many of these
courts have refused to recognize the validity of uncompensated foreign
nationalizations. However, these results have been based as much
on domestic ordre public as on international law. For example, in
Hahn R~hren-Walzwerk v. Stokvis, 284 a Dutch appellate court
(Gerechtsho) refused to give effect to a Czechoslovakian expropri-
ation because it was made without indemnification. The court stated,
"[a]s there was no right to compensation, the nationalization was
contrary to Netherlands ordre public .... "285 The domestic public
policy basis for these invalidations, as opposed to an international
basis, is an important distinction. It reveals an implicit unwillingness
to recognize an international minimum standard. Still, several mu-
nicipal courts have declared that an expropriation without compen-
284. Mar. 11, 1952, Gerechtshof, Arnhem, 1952 Nederlandse Jurisprudentie [N.J.]
No. 554, 19 I.L.R. 16.
285. 19 I.L.R. at 17-18. Similar rulings have been issued by virtually every major
West European nation and Japan. See, e.g., Austria: Lederer-Ponzer v. Rautenstrauch,
May 31, 1951, Sup. Ct., Aus., 18 I.L.R. 204, 205. Federal Republic of Ger-
many: Sociedad Minera el Teniente, S.A. v. The Aktiengesellschaft Norddeutsche Affi-
nerie, Jan. 22, 1973, Landgericht, Hamgurg, 12 I.L.M. 251, 275; Expropriation of Insurance
Companies Case, Dec. 15, 1950, Oberlandesgericht, West Berlin, 18 I.L.R. 197, 198;
Expropriation (Soviet Zone of Germany) Case, Sept. 19, 1949, Oberlandesgericht, Nurem-
berg, 3 Neue Juristiche Wochenschrift [NJW] 228, 16 Ann. Dig. 19, 20. France: Socidtd
Potasas Ibericas v. Bloch, Mar. 14, 1939, Cass. civ., Fr., 34 REVUE CRITIQUE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL 280, 9 Ann. Dig. 150, 151-52; Union des Rdpubliques Socialistes Sovidtiques
v. Intendant Gn6ral Bourgeois s-qualitd et Sociedtd la Ropit, Mar. 5, 1928, Cass., Fr.,
1929 Recueil G~ndral de Lois et des Arrts [S. Jur.] 1 217, 4 Ann. Dig. 67, 67-68; Cie
Nord de Moscou v. Phenix Espagnol, June 13, 1928, Cour d'appel, Paris, 1928 S. Jur. I1
161, 4 Ann. Dig. 66; Volatron v. Moulin, Mar. 25, 1939, Cour d'appel, Aix, 1939 Dalloz
Hebdomadaire 329, 9 Ann. Dig. 24, 25; Entreprise Nationale L. et C. Hardtmuth, Fabrique
de Crayons Koh-i-noor v. Fabrique de Crayons Koh-i-noor, L. et C. Hardtmuth, June 25,
1958, Cour d'appel,.Paris, 1959 Journal du Droit International 1098, 26 I.L.R. 50, 51.
Denmark: Bdnskd A Hutni Spole~nost v. Hahn, May 12, 1952, Western Provincial Ct.,
Den., 1952 Ugeskrift for Retsvaesen 856, 19 I.L.R. 18, 19. Italy: Koh-i-noor Tuikdrna
L. & C. Hardtmuth Narodni Podnik v. Fabrique de Crayons Hardtmuth L. & C., S.r.l.,
June 17, 1958, Corte app., Turin, 41 RIVISTA DI DIRIrro INTERNAZIONALE 597, 16 I.L.R.
44, 46. Japan: Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Idemitsu Kosan Kabushiki Kaisha, 1953, High
Ct., Tokyo, 20 I.L.R. 305, 312. The Netherlands: N.V. Trust-Maatschappij "Helvetia"
v. N.V. Assurantie-Maatschappij "De Nederlanden van 1845," Mar. 9, 1933, Arondisse-
mentsrechtbank, The Hague, 1933 N.J. 1662, 7 Ann. Dig. 80, 81. Romania: In re a
Russian Co., Dec. 5, 1932, Ct. of Cassation, Rom., 62 Clunet 718, 7 Ann. Dig. 82, 82.
British Territories: Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Jaffrate (The Rose Mary), [1953] I W.L.R.
246, 251-62, 20 I.L.R. 316, 320-28 (Sup. Ct., Aden 1953).
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sation violates international law.286
When some compensation has been paid, national courts have
approached the issue much more warily. In Anglo-Iranian Oil Co.
v. Idemitsu Kosan Kabushiki Kaisha287 the High Court of Tokyo held:
[I]n view of the fact that the Nationalization Law is not a com-
pletely confiscatory law [i.e., it has provided some compensation],
contrary to the rights and interests of foreign nationals, but a law
of expropriation subject to payment of compensation, the Court
feels bound to hold that it cannot try the validity or invalidity of
such a law by examining the compensation .... 211
In this case, the Iranian government provided for compensation up to
twenty-five percent of the value of the expropriated enterprises. 8 9
In Sociedad Minera el Teniente, S.A. v. The Aktiengesellschaft
Norddentsche Affinerie,290 a case arising out of nationalizations by
the Allende government in Chile, a West German superior court
(Landgericht) ruled that international law merely requires that an
expropriation provide a "reasonable indemnification." 2 91 Although
the court did not attempt to define "reasonable indemnification,"
several points are noteworthy. First, the court held that because the
expropriation was "effected for all practical purposes without indem-
286. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss Jena v. Firm Carl Zeiss, Apr. 2, 1963, Cour d'appel, Paris,
excerpt reprinted in Committee Report, The Compensation Requirement in the Taking of
Alien Property, 22 REC. A.B. CITY N.Y. 195, 214 (1967) (an uncompensated expropriation
violates international public order order); P.T. Escomptobank v. N.V. Assurantie Maat-
schappij de Nederlanden, June 6, 1963, Gerechtshof, The Hague, excerpt reprinted in
Committee Report, supra, at 215 (same); Bank of Indonesia v. Senembah Maatschappij
N.V., June 4, 1959, Gerechtshof, Amsterdam, 1959 N.J. 855, portions reprinted in 7 NETH.
INT'L L. REV. 400, 402 (1960) (an uncompensated expropriation violates international law
and Netherlands public order); Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Idemitsu Kosan Kabushiki Kaisha,
1953, High Ct., Tokyo, 20 I.L.R. 305, 313 (international law requires compensation for an
expropriation); In re Rhein-Main-Donau Ag., June 24, 1954, Const. Ct., Aus., 21 I.L.R.
212, 213 (an expropriation without compensation is contrary to international law) (dictum);
Lederer-Ponzer v. Rautenstrauch, May 31, 1952, Sup. Ct., Aus., 18 I.L.R. 204, 205 (an
expropriation without compensation is contrary to international law and Austrian public
order); Anglo-Iranina Oil Co. v. Jaffrate, [1953] I W.L.R. 246, 253, 259, 20 I.L.R. 316,
322-23, 328 (an expropriation without compensation violates international law and British
public policy); Koh-i-noor Tu~kdrna L. & C. Hardtmuth Narodni Podnik v. Frabrique de
Crayons Hardtmuth L. & C., S.r.l., June 17, 1958, Corte app., Turin, 41 RivISTA DI DiRrrTo
INTERNAZIONALE 597, 26 I.L.R. 44, 46 (an expropriation without compensation violates
international law and Italian public policy).
287. 1953, High Ct., Tokyo, 20 I.L.R. 305.
288. Id. at 313.
289. Id. at 306. The exact amount of compensation actually received by the claimant
was not revealed in the court's opinion.
290. Jan. 22, 1973, Landgericht, Hamburg, 12 I.L.M. 251.
291. Id. at 276.
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nification," international law had been violated.2 92 However, it
qualified this rule by declaring that property situated in a state is
normally subject to the sovereignty of that state. Accordingly, acts
of expropriation are internal matters of the expropriating state and
must generally be recognized as valid.293
In Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. S.U.P.O.R. Co., 294 an Italian court
held:
[I]t is not required . . . by the generally accepted provisions of
international law that the quantum of the compensation must ap-
pear actually equivalent to the value of the property forming the
subject of the expropriation, that is to say, it is enough that there
is some compensation for the expropriation to be lawful.295
Indeed, the court declared that international law is not violated if the
compensation is "not illusory. ' ' 296  The court, in upholding the
Iranian oil nationalization, noted that provision for the payment of
compensation had been made.2 97  Moreover, it emphasized that a
definition of fair compensation must take "into account the circum-
stances of each individual case and, therefore, [take] into consideration
also the public interest" of the nationalizing state.
298
In a very similar vein, in the late 1950's the high court
(Oberlandesgericht) of Bremen, West Germany considered Indone-
sian measures which had nationalized Dutch tobacco plantations, the
harvest of which had been exported to Germany. 299  Since no com-
pensation had actually been paid, the Dutch companies sought to
recover the tobacco on the grounds that the expropriation violated
292. Id. at 275-76. The Chilean expropriation law had provided for compensation.
However, a constitutional amendment was enacted which empowered President Allende to
retroactively deduct excess profits allegedly derived by foreign copper companies. After
these deductions, the nationalized Sociedad Minera El Teniente, S.A. was liable to Chile
for over $300 million. See Lillich, International Law and the Chilean Nationalizations-
The Valuation of the Copper Companies, 7 INT'L LAW 124, 130 (1973).
293. 12 I.L.M. at 273.
294. Sept. 13, 1954, Trib., Roma, 1955 Foro Italiano [Foro It.] I 256, 22 I.L.R. 23.
295. 22 1.L.R. at 36 (emphasis in original).
296. Id. at 36, 41.
297. Id. at 34, 37. The Iranian nationalization law provided compensation up to 25%
of the value of the expropriated oil. An appeals procedure was also created if the nationalized
company disagreed with the amount of compensation. See Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v.
S.U.P.O.R. Co., (The Miriella), Mar. 11, 1953, Trib., Venice, 1953 Foro. It. 719, 22
I.L.R. 19, 23.
298. 22 I.L.R. at 37.
299. N.V. Verenigde Deli-Maatschapijen v. Deutsch-lndonesische Tabak-Handelsge-
sellschaft, Aug. 21, 1959, Oberlandesgericht, Bremen, portions reprinted in Domke, In-
donesian Nationalization Measures Before Foreign Courts, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 305 (1960).
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German public order as well as international law. 00 The court, how-
ever, ruled that the expropriation did not violate international law.
In reaching this conclusion it reasoned that the Indonesian national-
ization law expressly provided for compensation and that the Dutch
companies had not succeeded in showing that Indonesia was in fact
unwilling to pay compensation or intended to defer such payment indefinit-
ely. 30 1  Noting that the expropriations were part of a broad policy of
social reform rather than isolated instances, the court held that
"[c]ompensation as to time and amount must ...be made in ac-
cordance with the conditions in the expropriating
state." 30 2  Recognizing the importance of a nation's ability to pay,
the court also declared that compensation may "be made out of the
proceeds of the nationalized enterprises. "303
During the inter-War period, the Supreme Court of Justice of
Czechoslovakia considered the question of expropriation on three
occasions. 304  Although these decisions may be suspect because the
Court was reviewing the legality of nationalizations performed by the
Czech government, it must also be remembered that inter-War
Czechoslovakia was a capitalist nation and essentially a French client
state.30 5 All three of the decisions held that international law did not
require full compensation for a property taking.3°6  The Court rea-
soned in the Swiss Subjects case:
A provision of international law which prohibits expropriation of
alien property without full compensation cannot be traced in any
source of that law. There is no general or particular international
convention containing such a stipulation .... As regards the gen-
eral principles of law recognized by civilized nations, it appears
that the legislation of all countries recognizes the permissibility
300. Domke, supra note 299, at 306.
301. Id. at 316. The Indonesian nationalization act created a committee which was to
determine the amount of compensation. It also provided for appeals to the Indonesian
Supreme Court from decisions of this committee. Id. at 317-18.
302. Cited in id. at 317.
303. Cited in id. at 317.
304. Czechoslovak Agrarian Reform (Swiss Subjects) Case, Apr. 8, 1927, Sup. Ct.
of Justice, Czech., 4 Ann. Dig. 147; Czechoslovak Agrarian Reform (Expropriation) Case,
Dec. 7, 1926, Sup. Ct. of Justice, Czech., 3 Ann. Dig. 135; Czechoslovak Agrarian Reform
(German Subjects) Case, Apr. 28, 1925, Sup. Ct. of Justice, Czech., 3 Ann. Dig. 133.
305. See A.J.P. TAYLOR, THE ORIGINS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR at 42 (2d ed.
1961); J.M. ROBERTS, A GENERAL HISTORY OF EUROPE: 1880-1945 at 417, 454, 510
(1977).
306. Swiss Subjects Case, 4 Ann. Dig. at 149; Expropriation Case, 3 Ann. Dig. at
135; German Subjects Case, 3 Ann. Dig. at 134.
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of expropriation with an express or tacit reservation that, should
it be prescribed by law for reasons of public welfare, the expro-
priation is admissible even with partial compensation only or with-
out any compensation at all.30 7
Moreover, all three opinions held that because of the well settled
principle that immovable property is subject to the laws of the state
in which it is situated, as long as foreigners are accorded the same
treatment as nationals, international law is not violated.30 8  As illus-
trated above, 309 treaty practice supports this reasoning.
In at least two cases, however, municipal courts have refused to
recognize expropriation decrees enacted by other nations. In one case,
the Supreme Court of Austria concluded that payment of one-twelfth
of the value of the nationalized property was insufficient
compensation. 310
In Laane v. Estonian State Cargo & Passenger Steamship Line,
(The Elise),31' the Canadian Supreme Court reversed the trial court's
ruling that twenty-five percent compensation was not inadequate.
However, the persuasiveness of this decision is diminished by a careful
review of the case. The case involved the purported nationalization
by the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic of all Estonian merchant
ships. However, as the trial court found, the Estonian registered S.S.
Elise was in Canadian territorial waters at the time the nationalization
decree was issued.312 In this regard, it is well-settled that the na-
tionalization decrees of one state have no effect on property situated
within the territory of another country.3 13  Indeed, the Supreme Court
307. Swiss Subjects Case, 4 Ann. Dig. at 149.
308. German Subjects Case, 3 Ann. Dig. at 134. Expropriation Case, 3 Ann. Dig. at
135-36. Swiss Subjects Case, 4 Ann. Dig. at 147-48.
309. See supra text accompanying notes 91-107, 135-74, 187-88, 217, 222.
310. Koh-i-noor, L. & C. Hardtmuth v. Koh-i-noor, Tulkdrna L. & C. Hardtmuth,
June 2, 1958, Sup. Ct., Aus., 26 I.L.R. 40, 41. This ruling, however, is arguably dictum
because the Court also found that the taking was discriminatory against aliens. Id.
311. 1949 S.C.R. 530 (Can.).
312. [1948] 4 D.L.R. 247, 262, 1948 Can. Exch. 435, 449, rev'd, 1949 S.C.R. 530
(Can.).
313. This principle of extraterritoriality has been widely recognized as a limitation on
the sovereignty of a state. See, e.g., Austria: Danuvia Feinmechanische und Werkzeug-
fabrik Nationalunternehmen v. Seiberth, Feb. 3, 1954, Sup. Ct., Aus., 21 I.L.R. 38, 38-
39. Belgium: Lowit v. Banque de Soci~td Gdndrale de Beligique, May 4, 1939, Com-
mercial Trib., Brussels, 9 Ann. Dig. 25. Federal Republic of Germany: Expropriation
(Soviet Zone of Germany) Case, Sept. 19, 1949, Oberlandesgericht, Nuremberg, 3 N.J.W.
228, 16 Ann. Dig. 19, 20. Great Britain: The Jupiter (No. 3), 1927 P. 122, 144 (Adm.
D.), affd, 1927 P. 250, 254-55 (C.A.). Italy: Svit Narodni Podnik, July 21, 1956, Corte
app., Bologna, summarized in 5 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 606 (1956). The Netherlands: Bank
of Indonesia v. Senembah Maatschappij, June 4, 1959, Gerechtshof, Amsterdam, portions
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of Canada recognized this norm as the primary reason for its refusal
to give effect to the Estonian expropriation.3 14  Relying on various
English cases, it held that foreign extraterritorial expropriations will
be recognized only when they comply with Canadian public policy,
i.e., when they provide full compensation." 5 Therefore, although
the Court subsequently held that the Estonian nationalization violated
international law because it failed to provide adequate compensa-
tion,3 16 to the extent that municipal courts generally prefer to inval-
idate foreign expropriations on the basis of extraterritoriality, this
conclusion may be considered obiter dictum.3 17
C. United States Courts
In the United States, the courts have traditionally held that in-
ternational law requires prompt, adequate and effective compensa-
tion.3"' In Sabbatino, the district court held that full compensation
is required by international law. 319  Despite its subsequent reversal
by the United States Supreme Court on the basis of the act of state
doctrine, the lower court's interpretation of international law has gen-
erally been regarded as good authority. In Banco Nacional de Cuba
v. Farr,320 the court of appeals concluded that the Supreme Court in
Sabbatino only reversed the district court with respect to its ruling
on the act of state doctrine 32 and not on its construction of international
reprinted in 7 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 400, 403 (1960). Switzerland: Vereinigte Carborundum
und Elecktritwerke v. Fed. Dep't for Intellectual Property, Sept. 25, 1956, Bundesgericht
(Tribunal f~dral, Tribunale federale), Switz., 82 Recueil officiel des Arrts du Tribunal
f6ddral Suisse [ATF] 11 196, 23 I.L.R. 24, 24-25. United States: Republic of Iraq v. First
Nat'l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1965) (per Friendly, J.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
1027 (1966).
314. 1949 S.C.R. at 536-37.
315. Id. at 536-37.
316. Id. at 538.
317. It is arguable that the dictum/holding distinction is meaningless in international
law since stare decisis, as applied in common law countries, is essentially non-existent in
international law. Cf. I.C.J. STATUTE arts. 38(1)(d) & 59; 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 10, §
19a, at 31.
318. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. 375, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1961),
rev'd on other grounds, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 187 (1965).
319. 193 F. Supp. at 385.
320. 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967).
321. In Sabbatino the district court held the act of state doctrine to be inapplicable.
193 F. Supp. at 380-83.
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law.322 This analysis, however, is questionable.
Although the Supreme Court did not specifically rule on the
merits of the amount of compensation due under international law,
the tenor of its opinion suggests a disapproval of the district court's
ruling that full compensation is required. Mr. Justice Harlan, writing
for the Court, noted that "[t]here are few if any issues in international
law today on which opinion seems to be so divided as the limitations
on a state's power to expropriate the property of aliens.' '323 Later,
in response to a claim that even if there is no consensus on the issue
of compensation, a taking without any indemnity is certainly contrary
to international law, the Court held: "If this view is accurate, it
would still be unwise for the courts so to determine. Such a decision
now would require the drawing of more difficult lines in subsequent
cases . ''324 It is clear that the Court implicitly recognized that
international law does not mandate full compensation. Moreover, the
Court declared that one of the bases for its invocation of the act of
state doctrine was the immense controversy over the expropriation
issue. 325
In the 1981 case of Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan
Bank,3 26 the Second Circuit became the first United States court to
rule that international law does not compel the payment of full com-
pensation. 327  The court declared that there are four alternatives con-
cerning the amount of compensation required: (1) no compensation,
(2) partial compensation, (3) appropriate compensation, and (4) full
compensation.3 28  After rejecting the first two alternatives, the court
held that "[i]t may well be the consensus of nations that full com-
pensation need not be paid 'in all circumstances,' . . . and that re-
quiring an expropriating state to pay 'appropriate compensation,' -
even considering the lack of precise definition of that term-would
come closest to reflecting what international law requires. 329  The
322. 383 F.2d 166, 183 (2d Cir. 1967). The act of state doctrine did not bar the
adjudication of this case because, after Sabbatino, Congress enacted the so-called
Hickenlooper Amendment which purported to overrule the Sabbatino decision. See 22
U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (West 1979).
323. 376 U.S. at 429 (footnote omitted).
324. Id. at 433.
325. "It is difficult to imagine the courts of this country embarking on adjudication in
an area which touches more sensitively the practical and ideological goals of the various
members of the community of nations." Id. at 430 (footnote omitted).
326. 658 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1981).
327. Id. at 892.
328. Id. at 891.
329. Id. at 892.
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court thus recognized that in reality the norm is not full compensation.
Although the court did not attempt to define "appropriate com-
pensation," two factors indicate that it is greater in amount than
deemed necessary by other nations' courts. First, the court reasoned
that in the instant case, appropriate compensation and full compen-
sation were equivalent.330 Second, the court's recognition of appro-
priate compensation must be considered in light of its refusal to declare
that partial compensation was sufficient. The court considered "ap-
propriate" compensation to be greater in amount than "partial" com-
pensation. Thus, the term "appropriate compensation," as used by
the court in Chase Manhattan Bank, must be taken to mean a degree
of compensation that comes close to representing full market value.
Several principles, of decreasing clarity, may be extracted from
the aggregate of these municipal court decisions. First, and most
obvious, is the conclusion that international law does require that
some indemnity be paid upon a property taking. However, as even
United States courts have begun to realize, full compensation is not
mandated. The precise amount of requisite compensation poses a
more difficult problem; yet several factors provide some guidance on
this issue. It should be noted that municipal courts have been very
reluctant to review the legality of nationalizations by foreign govern-
ments. Unless the amount of compensation paid was clearly unrea-
sonable, these municipal courts have deferred to the sovereignty of
the expropriating country. While it is arguable that these decisions
are based more on principles of international comity, i.e., respect for
another nation's sovereignty, than on substantive expropriation law,
this distinction is more theoretical than real. The right to expropriate
is a principle flowing directly from the notion of sovereignty. Ac-
cordingly, many nations have argued that, because of their sover-
eignty, they possess the sole power to establish the amount of com-
pensation. The practical effect of the decisions of municipal courts
has been to recognize foreign expropriations as long as the amount
of remuneration was not illusory. This practice has been so prevalent
that a customary norm may have evolved from judicial proceedings
alone. Therefore, it may be fairly said that international law, as
evidenced by court decisions, relegates to the taking nation the pre-
dominant role in setting the amount of compensation. If the indem-
nification paid bears a reasonable semblance, depending on the cir-
cumstances and equities of each individual case, to the value of the
330. Id. at 892-93.
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expropriated enterprise or property, an "injured" foreigner has no
cause for complaint under international law.
VII. DISPUTE SETTLEMENTS
In most recent cases, expropriation disputes have been resolved
by negotiated settlements.33" ' These so-called lump sum agreements
developed out of the post-War nationalizations undertaken by various
Eastern and Western European nations as part of broad programs of
socio-economic reform.33 2  Today, however, settlement by lump sum
agreement has been characterized as the norm rather than the excep-
tion. 333  Moreover, the total amount of negotiated compensation, as
a rule, has been less than full market value. Occasionally it has been
as low as one-third of the total value of the enterprise. 334  Therefore,
it has been suggested that due to the frequent resort to negotiated,
partial compensation agreements, such practice has become a cus-
tomary international rule.335  This contention was rejected by both
the trial court and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank. The district court
reasoned that the fact that
only a small -percentage of claims are recovered as a result of
lump-sum settlement diplomatic agreements does not allow us to
derive a principle of international law from that practice. In our
domestic litigation we do not regard the terms of tort or contract
damage settlements as establishing a rule of law. Over 90% of
the private civil litigation in this country is probably settled by
compromise prior to trial .... We would not look to the per-
centage settlements in such cases to determine the law of torts or
contracts; similarly, lump-sum settlement practice between nations
... is an inappropriate source for deriving principles of inter-
331. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 505 F. Supp. 412, 432
(S.D.N.Y. 1980), affidas modified, 658 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1981). See generally R. LILLICH
& B. WESTON, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: THEIR SETTLEMENT BY LUMP SUM AGREEMENTS
(1975).
332. Garcia-Amador, supra note 23, at 44.
333. Cf. id. at 44 (referring to negotiated lump sum agreements as an "inter-State
practice").
334. Id. at 45-46. See also Dawson & Weston, "Prompt, Adequate and Effective": A
Universal Standard of Compensation?, 30 FORDHAM L. REV. 727, 740 (1962) (noting that
prompt, adequate and effective compensation has not generally been afforded).
335. In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 505 F. Supp. at 432
(S.D.N.Y. 1980), affd as modified, 658 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1981) Cuba made such an
argument. Also cf. Garcia-Amador, supra note 23, at 44-50 (suggesting that there has been
a de facto abandonment of classical expropriation principles).
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national law concerning the compensation due for expropriated
property. 33
6
Similarly, the court of appeals declared that the argument
simply confuses adjudication with compromise. Partial compen-
sation inheres in the process of negotiation and compromise; we
should no more look to the outcome of such a process to determine
the rights and duties of the parties in expropriation matters than
we would look to the results of settlements in ordinary tort or
contract cases to determine the rules of damages to be applied.3 37
Although this logic appears persuasive, it is not compelling.
Both courts failed to note that in international law, unlike domestic
law, custom and practice are primary modes of legal development.
In this context it has been argued that while the Soviet Union and
other Communist-Bloc nations contend that no compensation is re-
quired by international law, in practice they have tacitly recognized
an obligation to make reparations. 38  For example, ex post facto
agreements by socialist nations to compensate foreigners whose prop-
erty has been taken aids in the establishment of a customary norm: at
minumum, some compensation must be paid. If this is true, it must
follow that agreements by Western states to accept partial compen-
sation also contributes to the creation of a norm that full market value
is not required.
3 39
The remainder of this section will be devoted to a case study of
a recent settlement agreement between the United States and Peru.
It should be noted from the outset, however, that the purpose of the
following discussion is not intended to belabor the point of whether
compromise settlement agreements have created a new customary
rule. Rather, it is to show that flexible and creative expropriation
336. 505 F. Supp. at 433.
337. 658 F.2d at 892.
338. See Doman, New Developments in the Field of Nationalization, 3 N.Y.U. J. INT'L
L. & POL. 306, 314 (1970); Committee Report, The Compensation Requirement in the
Taking of Alien Property, 22 REC. A.B. CITY N.Y. 195, 202-03 (1967); Orrego Vicufia,
supra note 22, at 721; Landau, Compensation Upon the Taking of an Alien's Property, 12
AM. Bus. L.J. 31, 33-34 (1974). See generally Drucker, Compensation Treaties Between
Communist States, 10 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 238 (1961).
339. Nevertheless, this author believes that both courts resolved the issue correctly,
albeit for the wrong reasons. First, while it is true that custom is a mechanism through
which international law is developed, such custom must reflect "a general practice accepted
as law ...." I.C.J. STATUTE art. 38(l)(c). Moreover, a contrary holding would en-
courage bootstrapping. That is, once settled that only partial compensation is required, the
new rule would serve as a basis to seek an even further reduction in any compromise
settlement.
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settlements are available, and indeed, may have possibly rendered
moot the entire question of an international minimum standard. In
July, 1975, the government of Peru, due to a desire to control its
natural resources, particularly its iron ore deposits, nationalized the
holdings of the Marcona Mining Company, a Peruvian subsidiary of
the American-owned Marcona Corporation. 34°
The Government charged that Marcona had minimized its tax base
by siphoning off profits through transferring part of the iron ore
price to the shipping cost [the mining company's shipper was
another subsidiary of Marcona Corporation]. It further alleged
that Marcona had claimed an illegal depletion allowance, extracted
disproportionately rich ore, and stripped its assets.3
41
Therefore, the Peruvian government announced that the expropriation
would be without compensation.
342
However, David Ganz, the legal advisor for the Inter-American
Affairs Office of the State Department, stated:
In retrospect it is clear that by August 1975 a negative reaction
against the expropriation had begun in the Peruvian Government
itself; internal critics viewed it as a poorly timed, almost irrational
act. . . . [l]t came at a time when Peru was already experiencing
serious balance of payments problems and iron ore prices were at
their lowest levels in a decade .... 343
Moreover, because "[m]any foreign companies were unenthusiastic
about pruchasing ore from an expropriated facility in view of the
likelihood of a law suit by Marcona," the Peruvian export of iron
ore was brought to a virtual halt. 344  As a result Peru lost between
eight and ten million dollars per month 345 and the government of
President Velasco was replaced in a coup d'6tat by a more moderate
regime. 346  The new government, headed by President Morales
Bermudez soon indicated its willingness to negotiate a settlement,
347
and by October, 1975, negotiations with representatives of the United
340. Ganz, The Marcona Settlement: New Forms of Negotiation and Compensation
for Nationalized Property, 71 AM. J. INr'L L. 474, 476 (1977).
341. Huerta, Peruvian Nationalization and the Peruvian-American Compensation
Agreements, 10 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 42 (1977).
342. Id. at 42; see also Muller, supra note 18, at 58.
343. Ganz, supra note 340, at 478.
344. Id. at 479-80.
345. Id. at 480; Huerta, supra note 341, at 43.
346. Muller, supra note 18, at 59; Ganz, supra note 340, at 478.
347. Muller, supra note 18, at 59.
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States government had commenced.3 48
By December, 1975, an interim agreement had been reached.
Peru signed a contract with the Marcona shipping subsidiary, Marcona
Carriers, in which it was agreed that the latter would have the right
to transport all Peruvian ore to Japan, Europe and the United
States.349  In return, Marcona "agreed to cease threatening legal ac-
tion against ore customers. ,30  However, complete accord was still
far off. The United States was seeking compensation of nearly $100
million but this amount was much higher than what the Morales
government was willing to pay.
35'
With the negotiations in an apparent deadlock, both sides began
to re-evaluate their positions. Ganz characterized the American
position:
U.S. negotiators were well aware that Peru's financial problems
were worsening and that it would be virtually impossible to obtain
a cash settlement from Peru consistent with the amounts that
Marcona was prepared to accept and with what the United States
believed could be characterized as prompt, adequate, and effective
compensation. 352
Thus, the United States began to search for a solution which would
both take into account the Peruvian economic situation as well as
provide Marcona with an equitable indemnity.353 In September, 1976,
an agreement was finally reached. The settlement included $37 mil-
lion in cash, a shipping contract with Marcona Carriers estimated to
be worth over $2 million, an ore sales contract with Marcona worth
over $22 million, and the discharge of almost $4 million owed by
Marcona to its nationalized subsidiary. 35 4  It has been estimated that
the entire settlement will ultimately be worth between $62 and $75
348. Ganz, supra note 340, at 479. Peru was unwilling to negotiate with Marcona
directly. Mr. Ganz has speculated that the reason for this was because Peru believed "that
negotiations with a foreign government would be less damaging politically for the regime
than negotiations directly with a foreign company." Id. at 478. It must be remembered
that in 1968, Peru had undergone a revolution and was attempting to implement social
reforms. Therefore, negotiations with a foreign multi-national corporation could be perceived
as submission to foreign capital.
349. Id. at 481.
350. Muller, supra note 18, at 59.
351. Ganz, supra note 340, at 482. Marcona originally demanded $140 million in
compensation. Huerta, supra note 341, at 42. However, Ganz indicates that the United
States believed this demand was unreasonable. Ganz, supra note 340, at 479.
352. Ganz, supra note 340, at 483.
353. Id.
354. Id. at 485; Huerta, supra note 341, at 43-44.
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million to Marcona. 355
Mr. Ganz has championed the Marcona settlement as "precedent
setting." 3 56  It was an agreement that was favorable to both sides.
Because it was not strictly a cash settlement and compensation was
tendered over a long period of time, it enabled Peru to nationalize an
industry without the effective impediment of having to pay prompt
and full compensation. In other words, Peru's ability to pay was an
essential element of the agreement. Moreover, through the sales
contract with Marcona, Peru attained "improved access to U.S. mar-
kets, which it has heretofore been unable to penetrate, and should
generate over a period of time more than enough foreign exchange
to pay the entire cost of the settlement. ''357  From the United States'
point of view, the agreement was also important. It has reinforced
the conclusion that "just" compensation is attainable and the best
means to such an end is through negotiation and a continuing rela-
tionship between the nation and the injured corporation rather than
via an adversary judicial proceeding. 358  Furthermore, Ganz contends
that "[t]he Marcona settlement, once its terms become known, may
also have an impact on the conduct of other developing nations'
governments." 359  That is, it illustrates the advantages in negotiation
and therefore encourages cooperation.
Because of the success of the Marcona settlement, the question
of whether an international minimum standard is even necessary,
arises. It is arguable that Mr. Ganz's conclusions are overly opti-
mistic. For example, at times there will be nations which expropriate
the property of foreigners without the payment of compensation and
thereafter refuse to negotiate. However, these situations are likely to
be the exception rather than the rule. First, the United States Congress
has given the President various economic measures to employ against
nations which have taken the property of American citizens or cor-
porations without full compensation. 360 The Hickenlooper Amend-
355. Ganz, supra note 340, at 486-87.
356. Id. at 488.
357. Id.
358. Id. at 488-89. Ganz emphasizes the value of the continuing relationship to
Marcona. Indeed, he alleges that the ore sales contract was "worth considerably more to
Marcona because of that company's access to and expertise in selling in the U.S. market
than it was to the Government of Peru which, because of market structures, had little chance
of selling directly to U.S. ore consumers." Id. at 489.
359. Id. at 489.
360. See generally Neville, supra note 10, at 69-73 for a discussion of these economic
measures.
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ment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 requires the President to
suspend aid to any country whose government has expropriated the
property of American citizens or corporations without prompt and full
compensation.16' Under the terms of the Trade Act of 1974, the
President must terminate the duty-free entry of merchandise privilege
for which developing countries may be eligible.3 62  Similarly, under
various other statutes the President must instruct the United States'
representatives to certain international development banks to vote
against any proposed loan to nations which have taken the property
of American citizens or corporations without the payment of prompt,
adequate and effective compensation.3 63  In view of the importance
of economic assistance and loans to the Third World nations, the
significance of these statutes cannot be underesti-
mated.3 64 Moreover, if a state continually expropriates the property
of foreigners without adequate compensation, 365 it will create an un-
favorable investment climate and discourage the future inflow of badly
needed foreign capital. 366  Thus, these economic forces will exert
pressure on developing nations to refrain from unilaterally national-
izing the property of aliens and thereafter refusing to negotiate a
settlement.
A more difficult problem, however, is posed by the terms of the
settlement itself. Although the Marcona settlement was favorable to
both sides, the fact remains that it was only one of many agreements.
In most agreements the terms have not been so acceptable to both
sides. It is true that the Marcona settlement may represent a model
for the future, yet it must be remembered that not all expropriations
lend themselves to a continuing relationship. For example, it is dif-
ficult to conceive of how a nationalization of banks or public utilities
could be remedied by a mutually profitable continuing relationship.
Accordingly, the Marcona settlement should not be viewed as a pan-
361. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(I) (West 1979).
362. 19 U.S.C. § 2461 (West 1980).
363. 22 U.S.C. §§ 283r (West 1979) (Inter-American Development Bank), 284j (In-
ternational Bank for Reconstruction and Development), 285o (Asian Development Bank),
and 290g-8 (African Development Fund).
364. Indeed, one commentator has argued that these statutes provide "direct and im-
mediate coercion to comply with the United States standard." Neville, supra note 10, at
73 (footnote omitted).
365. The adequacy of this compensation is to be defined by the subjective standard of
foreign investors, since they determine whether or not to invest in a particular country.
366. The chilling effect on future investment in nations which fail to adequately com-
pensate aliens has been widely recognized. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 9, at 517.
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acea to the problems posed by nationalization. Nevertheless, it is
important in the sense that it illustrates that creative solutions are
available. Although an international minimum standard exists, as
judicial practice has shown, it is a truly minimum standard. 67  That
is, as long as the compensation is not illusory, international law is
satisfied. Hence, the adequacy of negotiated settlements must be
analyzed in light of their alternatives. With this in mind, negotiation
is far more likely to achieve a better solution for injured corporations
than resort to judicial proceedings.3 68  Yet, it cannot be conclusively
said that there is no need for an international minimum standard; non-
judicial solutions, as preferable as they may be, simply cannot resolve
every expropriation case.
VIII. CONCLUSION
It was stated above that the purpose of this note is twofold: (1)
to determine whether full compensation ever was the international
standard and (2) to determine what is the present compensation stan-
dard. The first of these questions must be answered in the negative.
As treaties and judicial practice prior to the Second World War il-
lustrate, there was never sufficient consensus to sustain such a con-
clusion. Indeed, they suggest that traditional international law al-
lowed the taking state, subject to a duty to provide national and/or
most-favored nation treatment, to determine the amount of compen-
sation to be paid to expropriated foreigners.
The present status of international expropriation law is more
problematical. A review of judicial and arbitral decisions, recent
treaties and UN General Assembly resolutions illustrates that there is
a duty to pay at least some compensation. This norm, however, is
not coterminous with a requirement to pay full compensation. Al-
though most recent bilateral commercial treaties compel an indemnity
equal to the value of the expropriated property, the refusal of socialist
367. Cf. Dolzer, supra note 62, at 569 ("the Hull rule is today a 'maximum standard').
368. This view is echoed by the United States government. Cf. Smith, supra note 9,
at 520 ("We believe that issues concerning valuation of expropriated property are best
resolved by the parties themselves through negotiation, and we stand ready to facilitate
discussions between the parties aimed at achieving a mutually acceptable outcome").
Other mechanisms designed to reduce the likelihood of a nationalization have also been
suggested. These include joint ventures with the host country, gradual takeover by the host
nation, and a certain amount of reinvestment in the country by the foreign corporation. See
generally SWEENEY, OLIVER & LEECH, supra note 17, at 1184-94. However, similar to
negotiation, these arrangements cannot be viewed as a cure-all solution to the problems
posed by expropriation.
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and Latin American nations to accept this standard, as well as most
Europen nations' failure to constitutionally guarantee full remunera-
tion, have prevented the incorporation of the Hull Doctrine as a rule
of customary international law. Moreover, other sources of inter-
national law also dictate a conclusion that market value need not be
paid when a foreigner is deprived of his or her property. Most mu-
nicipal courts, while acknowledging that international law mandates
indemnification, are extremely loath to adjudicate the legality of a
foreign expropriation unless the amount of the indemnity is clearly
unreasonable. Similarly, to the extent that it is either reflective of or
has affected international law, the Charter of Economic Rights and
Duties of States declares that the measure of compensation is to be
determined by the law of the expropriating nation. Indeed, even UN
General Assembly Resolution 1803 accords to the taking state a certain
degree of consideration in establishing the degree of remuneration.
Consequently, there is substantial support for the proposition that
international expropriation law merely requires that the compensation,
in light of all the surrounding circumstances, be reasonably related
to the value of the property taken. Since this is truly a minimum
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APPENDIX A
The following is a list of treaties concluded by the United States
in which a foreign investor is allowed to invest in the host country



















































































































1. The country with which the United States has entered into a treaty.
2. The date of signature.
3. The type of treaty. Abbreviations: A = Amity, C = Commerce, E = Extradition,
F = Friendship, P = Peace.
4. The provision of the treaty which contains the requirement of submission to the
host country's laws.
5. All citations are to the United States Statutes at Large. The number to the left
of the colon refers to the volume. The numbers to the right of the colon refer to the page
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Art. 3 of Treaty















































Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
APPENDIX B
West German treaties with provisions specifying that, in the event
of an expropriation of foreign-owned property, compensation repre-












































































































I. The country with which West Germany has entered into a treaty.
2. The date of signature.
3. The article of the treaty which requires compensation representing the equivalent
of the investment affected.
4. The official citation. The citations are to Bundesgesetzblatt, Tel I [BGB f]. The
date to the left of the colon refers to the voluem. The number to the right of the colon
refers to the page on which the treaty begins.
5. Other citations. Unless otherwise noted the cites are to INVESTMENT TREATIES,
supra note 181. The date before the colon refers to the volume. The numbers after the
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APPENDIX C
The following is a list of Swiss treaties which require "effective




























































1. The country with which Switzerland has entered into a treaty.
2. The date of signature.
3. The article of the treaty which requires "effective and adequate compensation,
in accordance with international law."
4. The official citation. The citations are to Recueil officiel des lois et ordonnances
de la Confdedration suisse [ROLF]. The date before the the colon refers to the volume.
The number after the colon refers to the page on which the treaty begins.
5. Other citations. Unless otherwise noted the cites are to INVESTMENT TREATIES,
supra note 181. The date before the colon refers to the volume. The numbers after the
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APPENDIX D
The following is a list of British treaties which require compen-







































































































1. The country with which Great Britain has entered into a treaty.
2. The date of signature.
3. The article of the treaty which requires compensation equal to the market value
of the nationalized property.
4. The official citation. The citations are to the Great Britain Treaty Series. The
date before the colon refers to the volume. The number after the colon refers to the treaty
number. The number in the parenthesis refers to the command number.
5. Other citations. Unless otherwise noted the cites are to INVESTMENT TREATIES,
supra note 181. The date before the colon refers to the volume. The numbers after the
colon refer to the page on which the treaty begins and the page on which the specific article
may be found.
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